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ABSTRACT
“Just Get it Done”
How the New York City High School Admissions Process is
Re-defining the Work & Identities of Professionals in Screened High School-Programs
by
Heather Rippeteau
Advisor: Professor Nicholas Michelli
The implementation of the high school admissions process in the New York City Public
schools, has re-defined the work and identities of professionals working the screened
high school-programs. This study uses descriptive statistics culled from the Directory of
New York City High Schools for 2007 and 2017, and interviews with school personnel
from three screened school-programs, to review the impact of the implementation of this
process during its first full decade in existence. These data establish the fact that screened
school-programs are experiencing the phenomenon of marketization by way of their
admissions process. Further, the implementation of this process generates additional labor
for those professionals working at screened school-programs who are tasked with
coordinating the admissions process, but in some cases, for all professionals working in
screened school-programs however far removed their work may appear to be from the
admissions process. This research finds that, especially for those in the position of
“director” or “coordinator” of admissions, the work challenges traditional professional
identities, shifts the work of these educators towards customer service-related tasks, is
overwhelmingly performed by women and is largely unacknowledged by formal pay
structures, budget lines or job titles within the Department of Education nor its
accompanying unions (for example, “Director of Admissions” is not an official
Department of Education job title and there is no formal line in a school’s budget to
compensate for admissions-related costs or labor). This research provides a foundation
for those interested in further examining the New York City High School admissions
process or other education policies that may be referred to as “unfunded mandates,”
particularly those who are interested in the dilemmas of front-line workers and policy
implementation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
I. Overview of the Dissertation Research
The way an individual school reacts to, interprets and implements a policy handed
down by the larger school district can cause the work of the administrators, staff and
teachers to be redefined. This study examines how the implementation of the high school
admissions process has redefined the work of teachers, administrators and staff in
screened high school-programs in New York City, since its implementation in 2006. The
study examines trends in the admissions process across all screened high schoolprograms, and through interviews, explores how faculty, administrators and school staff,
experience their work around the admissions process.
A similar study to this has been conducted in law schools by scholars Wendy
Espeland and Michael Saunder, in evaluating how the phenomenon of public rankings
have redefined the work of law school deans, professors and admissions staff. Saunder
and Espeland used a similar publication to the Directory of New York City High Schools
to compile initial data, which concluded that the phenomenon existed and provided
descriptive data on programs that were impacted, and, like this study, they triangulated
their findings with interviews of those whose work was affected by the larger
phenomenon. Most of the existing literature on the high school admissions process in
New York City public schools focuses on the experience of students and families
navigating the process. There is only one other U.S.-based study that looks at the impact
of this system on the practices and attitudes of public high school professionals tasked
with designing, implementing and managing a school's admissions policy, largely on
their own with little to no guidance or regulation from the school district-- that study
focused on the gaming strategies employed by high school principals navigating the high
school choice arena.
This study adds dimension to the school choice and school labor literature by
examining the work lives of those tasked with implementing high school choice in New
York City screened school-programs. I conclude from the research that marketization has
indeed been deeply enacted in the New York City’s screened high school-programs and
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that individuals working within the admissions system of their school-program have, in
many cases, internalized and normalized the importance of this phenomenon by
validating the importance of the admissions system, even as they simultaneously embrace
and reject it. This study establishes the ways the work of school professionals in screened
school-programs has been redefined and the impacts of those redefinitions. For those
professionals most deeply involved in admissions work, the impact has been an
intensification of work, by way of the school-program increasingly using labor-intensive
admissions requirements, increasing participation in marketing and customer-service
related tasks, and going largely unpaid for doing that work. For those professionals
working in screened school-programs who have limited involvement in the admissions
process, they also may experience an intensification of marketing and customer-service
related work or shifts in professional culture that cause them to amend their professional
identities in order to continue working at the school-program.
While this research provides a strong foundational entry point to examining the
impact of marketization, there are several ways this research could be improved and other
areas of the school system that need a similarly structured interrogation to demonstrate
the extent of the impact of this redefinition of the work of school professionals.
The Screened School Program
It has been nearly 15 years since former mayor Michael Bloomberg, and his
schools chancellor Joel I. Klein, put high school choice policy at the forefront of their
education reform movement in New York City. As such, we can now reflect on this
decade of experiences and begin to draw some meaningful conclusions about its impact,
not just on students and families, but on the schools themselves and the people who work
in them. The goal of this study is to find out how the marketization of public schools has
redefined the experience and understanding of school for administrators, faculty and staff
and finally, whether marketing has helped NYC public high schools better match
themselves with appropriate 8th grade applicants. The bigger question, above all else, is
what can these elements tell us about equity of access and opportunity in New York’s
public high schools?
2

As school choice policies have become more deeply enacted and internalized in
New York City public high schools, schools are moved to engage in marketing strategies
and more complex admissions processes in order to compete for applicants. Like a
college whose public profile is raised by its low percentage of acceptance rates, public
high schools in New York City are compelled to better market themselves and manage
their admissions processes. In particular, New York City has stratified its public high
school system by admissions method, where schools with the most selective methods
have the ability to cull the highest performing students from the pool of applicants. The
most selective of these are the “specialized high schools” that require students to perform
well on the Specialized High School Admissions Test, followed by “screened” schools.
Screened high schools are those high schools, or programs within a high school,
which require student applicants to rank their school or program and do something else or
a combination of “something elses”— over the years, these have included attending a
school tour, providing a writing sample, submitting a supplemental application or a
variety of other actions-- which are designed by each individual school or program and
made available to the public (Corcoran & Levin, 2010). In 2017 there were one hundred
and sixty-one public high school programs in New York City fall into the category of a
“screened” program (excluding those screened for language and a students’ recent arrival
in the United States). Students applying to these schools are taking a risk: screened
schools do not automatically accept students based on the Specialized High School
Admissions Test scores nor do they just accept any student that applies to attend. Every
screened school has to develop its own process for selecting applicants and learn how to
market their school to students, guidance counselors, and families that are going through
the high school application process. Additionally, all schools undergo highly publicized
accountability measures, which pressure schools to maintain or raise their reputations
(Siskin, 2010; Corcoran & Levin, 2010). Which students a school accepts may be a factor
in how well the school can maintain its reputation in the competitive high school
marketplace, making the admissions process very high-stakes. With the exception of their
first year of existence, schools do not typically receive a designated portion of their
budget to offset the costs associated with these processes.
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Every year these screened schools have the added high-stakes responsibility of
choosing their students. Each year they may need to train faculty or staff on how to
participate in the process, many provide tours, hold auditions, interviews or on-site
writing sample days that require staff and space. Further, each year schools must decide if
their chosen process is meeting their needs, if it is attracting the applicants they want, and
how to adjust the process if it doesn’t.
The goal of this study is to illuminate the ways that screened high schools have
handled the process of becoming marketized; to examine the ways this process has
impacted their daily work and the implications these findings have for equity in New
York City’s public schools.
Language: “School” versus “Program”
The language of “school” versus “program” is important to this study, as the
Department of Education allows different admissions methods to be used within the same
school for different programs. For example, Automotive High School in Brooklyn has
five different programs within the larger school, serving 372 students. The programs at
Automotive use three different admissions methods to fill their seats: one program uses
the “screened” method, two use the “ed-opt” method and two use the “limited
unscreened” method. These five programs together make up one school with its own
faculty, leadership and budget. On the other hand, there are single programs that
represent an entire high school, like Marble Hill High School for International Studies in
the Bronx, which is one high school of 447 students that only offers one Humanities &
Interdisciplinary focused program, using the “screened” method for admissions. For this
purpose, I choose to use the language “school-program” to describe each program
because high schools in New York City fall into one of these two categories: either a
stand-alone high school or a program within a school. To preserve the accuracy of the
research of others, I simply use the word “school” or the words that the authors use that
are often describing schools more broadly than those in New York City. In the parts of
this publication that include my own research, I use the phrase “school-program,” which
is specific to New York City’s high schools.
4

Research Questions
This study began with the question: How has the work of school professionals
been redefined by the implementation of the high school admissions process? How has
redefinition impacted the nature and role of the work of school professionals, if any
redefinition exists? Since the inception of the study, however, the research questions have
expanded to understand more nuanced versions of this question that were guided by the
current literature described above, quantitative data analysis on the Directory for New
York City High Schools, and interviews with professionals in the field. Such extended
questions have uncovered the relevance of a school-programs established history, the
relevance of the institutional history of individuals navigating the admissions process,
and the impact on individual professionals as they express the burdens and rewards of
taking on the responsibility of admissions at their school-program.
II. My Stake & Interest in this Study
In the Fall 2007 I entered the school system as a new teacher at two critical points
in New York City Public Education: first, the admissions process as it currently stands,
was in its second year, making it an established policy that users on all sides were
becoming more adept at; and second, a recent union contract had been enacted that made
union issues, and talk of the contract, a common talking point amongst colleagues. These
two elements shaped how I came to understand the admissions process, my investment in
it, and my curiosity about personnel work in this process, which ultimately prompted this
study.
I have continued to teach and work in a screened school-program since that time
and what I saw, in both principals who led my school during the last ten years, were
school leaders who were essentially trying to cobble it together every year; to make this
process happen in a way that treated every child who submitted an application fairly, to
make the school accessible to those who wanted to see it without disrupting the learning
of our current students, and to get and pay the personnel needed to pull off this feat every
year.
5

As I became more invested in my school’s admissions process by participating in
tours and reading admissions material, I began to suspect that there must be a protocol, a
more organized or regulated way of doing this work-- surely there was a formal system.
As I spoke to other educators, former classmates and friends, I realized that no, there was
no one system; that each school that, like mine, was a screened school-program, had to
develop its own system and figure out how to make it work for them. On one hand I
thought, how wonderful to have such autonomy, but on the other hand, how could there
be no formal process or support in such an otherwise highly regulated industry?
I wanted to know more. I wanted to know why it seemed that our annual choices
for implementing this process were unpredictable, why school leaders couldn't reasonably
predict whether there would be money to pay people to participate in admissions
processes at school-programs, why so many personnel had daily and annual tasks related
to the admissions process that were not part of their formal job descriptions, even though
they did those jobs every year. I wanted to know if the DOE knew about this, if the union
knew about this, and how much it all would really cost if it all was being paid for; what
sacrifices would a budgeting principal have to make in order to make this process more
equitable to the applying 8th grade students and to the high school personnel who were
tasked with carrying out each part of the process?
My curiosity led me to this study. Now a seasoned teacher with a decade of
classroom teaching under my belt and a greater understanding of the New York City
Public School System thanks to experience and graduate studies, I have produced a body
of research that begins to uncover possible answers to the questions that baffled me a
decade ago.
III. Organization of Dissertation Chapters
The chapters of this dissertation are organized to help the reader build their
understanding of the admissions process for screened school-programs, to richly describe
screened school-programs as they are presented in the Directory of New York City High
Schools and through the public school-quality data provided by the New York City
Department of Education, to demonstrate the phenomenon of marketization in New York
6

City’s screened high school-programs and then to illustrate how this phenomenon
impacts the daily and annual work of the admissions process in screened schoolprograms. Finally, I discuss the greater picture that is painted by the collected data, its
possible implications and limitations, and places where the next body of research should
look to enhance and expand the research presented here.
Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the research literature that brought about this
study and supports its framework. Here I discuss literature on marketization of the public
sector, public high school choice and high school admissions processes, college
selectivity and high school admissions, rankings and accountability in public schools, and
the medical school match model. Within each category of literature, I layout a narrative
of the creation of the screened school-program admissions process and show how the
current literature, which is mostly focused on higher education, is relevant to the high
school admissions process in New York City public schools and its impact on the adult
professionals working in those school-programs. Together, this literature establishes my
use of Foucauldian governmentality as the appropriate theory for understanding the
impact of marketization on the work of the adult professionals in screened schoolprograms. This chapter also discusses Foucauldian governmentality and the research of
scholars who have theorized this idea into both the neoliberal world and, specifically, into
the world of public education.
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of each phase of data collection and analysis,
the literature that supports the selection of these strategies and limitations of the dataset
and selected strategies for analysis. This chapter first discusses the collection and analysis
of the quantitative dataset, built from the New York City Directory of High Schools for
the years 2007 and 2017, and datasets available through OpenNYC, which informed the
data collection and analysis in phase two: interviews with professionals who work in
three screened school-programs in New York City.
Chapter 4 examines the findings of the descriptive statistics of screened schoolprograms and establishes the existence of the phenomenon of marketization in New York
City’s screened high school-programs. This data is organized in the same order as the
current literature was presented. The chapter demonstrates the relevance of each piece of
literature and where I accept or reject the conclusions of other scholars, as their ideas
7

relate to the admissions process for screened-school programs and the work of the
professionals who implement it.
Chapter 5 examines the findings of participant interviews, where I interviewed ten
school-program personnel across three screened school-programs in New York City.
Here the findings are organized first, according to the coding categories that were used to
analyze the interviews, then by school-program and individual’s ideas within the same
school-program, and then there is a brief discussion of the ways that this coding category
illuminated similarities and differences between school-programs. Finally I address the
unexpected patterns that emerged from the interviews, which serve as the basis for
Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 brings together the analysis of findings from both the descriptive
statistics in Chapter 4 and the interviews in Chapter 5. Here I discuss an analysis of the
whole picture, implications of the research at the local and national levels,
recommendations for changes and improvements to the admissions system, and areas for
further research on the impact of marketization in New York City’s public school system
as it relates to the work of the professionals tasked with implementing it.
Summary of Chapter 1
This chapter provides the research questions, historical background, and my personal
interest in the completion of this study. The chapter discussed the basic overview of the
research, including earlier studies that I drew from to create my study, the brief review of
what screened high school programs are, a note about how the study changed my
language when referring to school-programs, and a bit about my experience working on
admissions at a screened high school-program. Lastly this chapter provides an
explanation of how the chapters are organized to create a coherent overall research
document, but also shows how each chapter is internally organized to support the reader
in understanding the phenomenon of marketization, as it relates to the screened schoolprogram’s admissions process.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
I. Unifying Ideas from Relevant Literature
This research brings together several areas of inquiry including literature on the
marketization of the public sector, school choice policy, college selectivity, rankings and
accountability literature, and the medical school-matching model. I also draw deeply on
literature that marries neoliberalism to Foucauldian theory and public schools in the
Theoretical Framework section of this paper. It is the concepts presented in this body of
literature that formed the basis for my initial phase of data collection, to establish the
existence of the phenomenon of marketization in screened school-programs, the factors
and practices that define marketization in screened school-programs, and then to select
participants whose lived work experience would further describe the impact of the
phenomenon.
Marketization of the Public Sector:
Marketization can be broadly defined as a good or service that is undergoing the
process of becoming a free-market version of itself. This process is often linked with, but
does not necessarily have to include, the process of privatization, the selling off of public
goods and services to the private sector. Three authors have explored this phenomenon
most closely in public education providing clear definitions of marketization (Whitty &
Power, 2000), how marketization works in the public sector (Levaçic, 1995), and an
ethnographic study of the impacts of martketization in public education (Cucchiara, Gold
& Simon, 2011).
Geoff Whitty and Sally Power’s work deeply examined the meaning of
marketization as it relates to the emergence of this phenomenon in public education.
Whitty and Power state that:
marketization most often refers to the development of ‘quasi-markets’ in state funded
and/or state provided services…quasi-markets in education [involve] a combination of
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parental choice and school autonomy, together with a greater or lesser degree of public
accountability and government regulation (Whitty & Power, 2000).

New York City’s high school choice system certainly meets the criteria of a quasi-market
by implementing parental choice, school autonomy, greater public accountability and
government regulation. I detail ideas about school choice policy in the next section of this
literature review, but school autonomy and increased public accountability and regulation
are hallmarks of marketization that can be discussed here and will be revisited in later
sections.
During former mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration, New York City’s
public high schools were given greater accountability and regulation through two major
reforms, the first being the implementation of two system-wide performance management
tools: the annual school Progress Report and the Quality Review. The second major
reform for accountability and regulation was greater autonomy and regulation for
principals.
School Progress Reports and the Quality Review were implemented in 2006 and
2007, respectively, and based on the work of then chief accountability officer at the
Department of Education James Liebman (Childress et al, 2010). The goal of these
accountability tools was to sharpen the focus on student progress, emphasize capacity
building within the school organization, and measure the success of the school leader
(Hill, 2010). The Progress Report uses student achievement data such as student progress
from year to year, student performance based on standardized exam scores, and school
environment based on the annual Learning Environment survey distributed to parents,
students and teachers, to calculate a letter grade for each school: A through F. Although
this accountability tool was discontinued in 2013 with a change in administration, the
effects of the tool are still relevant for the majority of the decade this research covers.
The Quality Review score qualifies a school as well-developed, proficient, developing or
under-developed. The metrics for this tool have changed many times since 2007, but they
generally evolve from a school visit of between one and two days, by a reviewer who
observes instruction, meets with students, parents, and teachers, and seeks to understand
the school as an organization, its culture, beliefs and the overall coherence of instruction
from classroom to classroom (Hill, 2010).
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Connected to the Progress Report and Quality Review, the second reform
included shifts in leadership and school governance that allowed principals the ability to
hire and fire teachers (within UFT contract guidelines) and increased principal’s control
over their budgets and their buildings (Hill, 2010). These reforms also implicated the
teacher’s union, in the form of mutual consent hiring, permitted through the 2005 UFT
teachers contract and although it is not explicitly stated anywhere, likely gave greater
control to principals over factors that affect the admissions processes in their schools.
These factors might have included budgeting for marketing, allocating per-session for
faculty and staff to participate in admissions activities, and/or creating the expectation
that certain staff and faculty must participate in admissions activities, new student
orientations, and school tours.
Rosalind Levaçic deepens Whitty and Power’s “quasi-market” by identifying the
distinguishing characteristics of a quasi-market for a public service. Levaçic sees these
characteristics as “the separation of purchaser from provider and an element of user
choice between providers.” Further, she states that quasi-market are typically highly
regulated, where the government controls “such matters as entry by new providers,
investment, the quality of service, and price, which is often zero to the user” (Levaçic,
1995). This can be directly observed in New York City’s high school choice program in
that the Department of Education (the provider) is somewhat removed from parents,
students and schools (purchasers). The Department provides the element of user choice
through the Office of Portfolio Management and Office of School Quality, both of which
are tasked with ensuring that the Department is offering school choices that parents and
students want, and that are of high quality, as defined by the performance metrics
identified above.
An example of the effects of marketization in public schools is found in the work
of Cucchiara, Gold and Simon’s 2011 study of Philadelphia public schools. Over the
course of six years, the authors found that the marketization of Philadelphia public
schools had a “major impact on the district's institutional structure and practices for
interacting with local stake-holders.” They found that the process of marketization
resulted in the limited “ability of individuals and groups to work with and influence the
school district and hold officials accountable.” Most relevant to my study, the authors
11

cited an increased “focus on customer service… [and] the individual at the expense of
collective forms of action and, more broadly, undercutting of the understanding of
education as a public good” (Cucchiara, Gold & Simon, 2011). The focus on customer
service and the individual is particularly important to my study, as it identifies the ways
that schools must manage their accountability metrics and school quality in order to meet
the needs of a customer base, in the form of students and families. This management is
further discussed in the section on rankings and accountability.
Public High School Admissions & School Choice Policies:
When studying school choice policies, scholars in the United States have most
often focused on the agency and power of families and students in the school choice
setting (Bast & Walberg, 2004; Hastings, Kane & Staiger, 2005; Hemphill & Nauer,
2009; Perez, 2011). While this literature often highlights the struggles of families and
children to navigate the school choice context, a more viable set of literature for this
study includes European studies on the relationship between school choice and school
climate, United States-based literature that demonstrates why New York City is the ideal
place to conduct a study like the one proposed here, and one particular study on the
school choice experience of schools in New York City.
Scholars studying schools outside of the United States have turned their attention
to the agency of schools in choosing students in a school choice setting. These scholars
have found that school agency is particularly important when accountability measures are
in place, which incentivize schools to compete for students who will enhance their
outcomes on those measures (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe, 1993). British schools have been
found to successfully attract the needed applicants to meet their accountability targets
when they employed marketing strategies and crafted admissions policies to suit these
ends (Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 1995). Swedish schools that are engaged in the competitive
school choice process have been accused of imparting negative effects on individual
teachers by intensifying their work, challenging traditional professional values and
identities, and “making teachers’ tasks increasingly about marketing” (Lundstrom &
Holm, 2011). These international studies encourage the need for a study like the one
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proposed here, that focuses on school agency and the impact of marketization on the
school itself in the United States.
New York City is an ideal location to perform a research study that turns its
attention to school marketization in the U.S., particularly focusing on school agency in
the school choice setting. During Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration, a set of
sweeping school reforms were put in place, beginning with the leadership Joel Klein, as
chancellor of schools from 2002 through late 2010 and carried out by subsequent
chancellors including Cathleen Black and Dennis Walcott, who led the schools from
2011 until Bloomberg’s transition out of office at the end of 2013. Bloomberg’s reforms
are commonly referred to as the Children First Initiatives and are widely regarded as his
most important legacy. Among these reforms, a major overhaul of the public high school
system was implemented starting in 2003, including a sharp increase in the number of
high schools in the city and the implementation of a mandatory school choice system for
all public high school students (Siskin 2010). In the mandatory high school choice
system, “high schools post descriptions and admission criteria on their websites and in
[the Directory of NYC High Schools], students rank up to twelve choices and then a
complex algorithm, managed at the central office, matches students with programs or
schools” (Siskin, 194). Siskin’s overview of the high school choice system agrees with
the international findings of Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe and Lundstrom and Holm when she
identifies the fact that schools must be “‘in the business’ of recruiting students and
marketing [themselves],” and acknowledges the fact that these processes add
responsibilities for staff that may shift their priorities and practices.
The existing literature places a focus on the importance of accountability
measures as a motivator for school agency, which only further illuminates the need for a
U.S.-based study like the one proposed here. Siskin establishes the fact that admissions
statistics have an impact on the accountability measures that are used to rate schools each
year:
The data on numbers of applicants per seat for each school are published, and factored
into the [Department of Education’s] assessment of schools. Seeing ‘five or ten students
for every seat,’ staff say, is considered a sign of demand that indicates a ‘healthy’ school
(Siskin, 195).

13

According to this statement, the admissions process is not only used for accountability
but also reinforces the market idea that demand indicates a “healthy” school. To support
Siskin, Jennifer Jennings is one of the few scholars who has studied the issue of school
agency not just in the United States, but specifically in New York City. Her findings take
Siskin’s facts further and bolster those found in British schools, by proving that
accountability measures influence the kind of admissions processes and marketing
strategies that schools implement to raise their accountability profile. After studying three
principals who lead schools that use the “limited unscreened” admissions method,
Jennings found that when principals felt pressured by the strong accountability measures
in New York City, they employed a variety of less-visible strategies to attract applicants
that they believed would enhance their performance on those measures.
Jennings argues that in New York City the lack of regulation of the choice system
allows principals to create admissions policies that “game” the system. These gaming
techniques can include emphasizing the school uniform policy to undesirable applicants
or targeting marketing materials towards middle schools that send strong candidates, all
which produce a student population that aims to strengthen a school’s performance on
accountability measures. The limited unscreened admissions method is supposed to be a
less-competitive method for gaining entry to a high school however, Jennings’ work
proves that these school leaders are finding ways to manage their competing needs that
do not exemplify the ideals of equity that the Department of Education hoped to create
with the high school choice policy.
In Europe, scholars have developed a school agency lens in reviewing school
choice policies that appears to be largely absent from the literature on United States
education, let alone places like New York City that have been held up as models of
market-reform by the federal government under President Obama and his Secretary of
Education, Arne Duncan. Siskin’s work is informative, but it’s only an overview of the
Children First high school reforms. Jennings provides and on-the-ground look at the work
that principals do to manage the competing priorities of educating children and meeting
accountability measures. The next step is to take the school agency lens to school
personnel and review how admissions processes and marketing strategies impact the
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administration, faculty and staff of a high school in New York City, where school choice
is mandatory.
While Jennings found it helpful to review the practices of principals in a limited
unscreened school, I choose to study screened schools because they are actually charged
with the responsibility of creating and implementing their own admissions processes in
addition to utilizing, or not, marketing strategies. If Jennings’ findings that a lack of
regulation of the choice system allows limited unscreened schools to use “less-visible” or
under-the-radar strategies to attract more desirable applicants, what are schools that have
been given the right to create their own admissions criteria doing in this unregulated
setting? The participant selection methods that I have designed, will allow me to study
the experiences of individuals in screened schools that have both successfully met the
Department of Education’s market-criteria of a “healthy” school and those who have
fallen short of this ideal. Healthy schools are labeled as such because they have a high
rate of applicants in contrast to the number of seats available and have maintained or
exceeded their accountability measures. Contrastingly, an unhealthy school has a lowered
rate of applicants in contrast to the number of seats available and has scored low on
accountability measures. I hope to contribute to the next layer of literature that will
explore how admissions processes and marketing strategies have redefined the work and
daily experiences of school for administrators, faculty and staff; to review how personnel
manage, as all of the literature identifies, the “added responsibilities” of school choice.
College Selectivity & High School Admissions:
The research on college selectivity is useful for understanding admissions
processes on both sides of the coin: the school and the applicant. I’ve focused here on the
work of Caroline Hoxby, and the role of students in generating greater college selectivity,
and the work of Ernest Pascarella, and the role of college selectivity as a measure of
institutional quality.
In her working paper, The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges (2009),
Caroline Hoxby found that the perceived increase in college selectivity is only a true
increase in some schools, while in others selectivity has actually fallen. Looking at
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college acceptance rates, SAT/ACT scores, spending per student and tuition between the
1960s and early 2000s, her findings suggest that the increasing selectivity that exists
among a smaller group of institutions is due to two elements that fuel each other, creating
a sort of Catch-22 that favors institutions that have been more selective since the 1960s.
The first element driving increased selectivity is an applicant issue. Hoxby finds
that “students preference for college with respect to its proximity to home has fallen
substantially over time,” because applicants are more “sensitive to a college’s resources
and student body,” than its proximity to home (p. 22). This finding demonstrates that
students are casting their college nets geographically wider, considering national options
rather than just local ones. This first element also drives the second element, which is an
institutional issue: institutions where selectivity has increased are also colleges that have
greater resources per student and the amount of resources per student they have is rising
faster than at other colleges. Essentially there is a double feather in the cap for colleges
that have been historically more selective: they receive greater endowments for spending
per student and the demand among first-time freshman applicants is for schools that have
increased resources per student. By being highly selective in the 1960s a college’s ability
to be even more selective in the 2000s is exaggerated because of the market forces of
providing greater resources per student and students wanting to be at a college that has
greater resources per student.
Hoxby’s overall findings are important to this study because they demonstrate
that high schools that were selective in the early days of high school choice are more
likely to continue to be successful in matching themselves with applicants who are highly
qualified now, a decade since high school choice has been in place. Further, Hoxby’s
findings also bring the factor of location into my study. As knowledge of the high school
choice system increases, eighth grade students can become more strategic about their
options. They are no longer focused on their zoned or local school, rather they cast the
net wider, making the marketing of a high school’s resources and opportunities key in
attracting top applicants.
Hoxby’s findings also help to justify my participant selection criteria. Although
public colleges do discriminate tuition costs based on residence, acceptance is not based
on residence. Similarly, I have included in my criteria that my participating schools must
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be open to all New York City residents. Residential location is a widely used tactic of
screened schools; for example, Eleanor Roosevelt High School, a highly sought screened
school, gives admissions priority to students who live in District 2 where the school is
located. However, my study focuses on the impact of marketization in screened high
schools when all other things are equal; allowing schools in the study that prioritize
admissions through residence would create an additional layer of advantage and
disadvantage between the participating schools.
To bolster Hoxby’s findings, another piece of important scholarship on college
selectivity relevant to this study is Ernest Pascarella and Patrick Terenzini’s book How
College Affects Students: A Third Decade of Research (2005). Relevant to this research is
their finding that selectivity in college matters as a measure of institutional quality and
that the opportunities facilitated by a college environment have positive impacts on job
satisfaction, earnings, and preparation for the professional world. In their research on
“between college effects” Pascarella and Terenzini find that “institutional quality,
particularly student body selectivity, has a statistically significant positive net impacts on
subsequent earnings” (p. 538). In their review of the literature, the authors found that
when institutional quality is measured by selectivity, “attending a college with a 100point higher SAT score or ACT equivalent is associated with a net increase of two to four
percent higher earnings later in life” (p. 538). Institutional quality can also be measured
by expenditures per student, tuition costs, number of faculty members with doctorates,
faculty- student ratios, and reputational rankings, which I discuss in the next section.
However, none of these measures are as positively statistically significant for student
earnings as college selectivity.
In their examination of “within college effects,” Pascarella and Terenzini also
found that college grades, affiliation with extracurricular or social groups, student-faculty
interaction, work or internship experiences, and academic experiences also have a
statistically significant positive net impacts on earnings, preparation for the professional
world, likelihood to enter an academic field, employment immediately after college, and
career development, respectively.
Pascarella & Terenzini’s findings when combined with Hoxby’s work are relevant
to this study because they illuminate the ideas that a school’s selectivity, and how it
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manages its resources make the school an attractive candidate for an applicant. However,
those characteristics are enhanced when a school can demonstrate its ability to facilitate
experiences like extracurricular activities, academic experiences, work or internship
opportunities, and heightened student-faculty interaction. These elements can all
potentially serve as variables in our quantitative analyses of each participating school.
For example, a quantitative analysis of the Directory of NYC High Schools data will
allow me to test combinations of school quality and/or experiential variables against
selectivity—sort of a Pascarella/Terenzini versus Hoxby analysis. In the case of New
York City’s screened public high schools, these variables might include the applicant to
seat ratio, as a measure of selectivity, versus measures of school quality or experiences
such as average admit GPA, state test scores in English and Math, affiliated partner
organizations, extracurricular activities, Advanced Placement course offerings,
graduation rates and college acceptance rates.
Rankings & Accountability In Public Schools:
The advent of the standards and accountability movement, most heartily pushed
forth in the United States under the administrations of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton, a
new form of school measurement was developed for public consumption: the school
ranking. The emergence of school rankings has been accompanied by “political
spectacles,” as Murray Edelman calls them: strategically timed, highly publicized
announcements of the rankings that cast winners and losers and frame narratives about a
given school or group of schools. Nowhere are school rankings more sensationalized than
in cities with K-12 public school choice landscapes like New York City, where these
rankings are based on public accountability measures and actually have a measurable
impact on the ways that school choice is enacted.
Michael Sauder and Wendy Espeland’s research illuminates the complex nature
of ranking systems, using the Foucauldian notions of discipline, surveillance in the form
of bio-power, normalization and internalization to explain how rankings of law schools
act a form of governmentality (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). In their study, Sauder and
Espeland used a mixed method approach that included analysis of documentation related
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to law school admissions both on the applicant and institution side, analyses of law
school rankings over the last fifteen years and interviews with law school administrators
who manage elements of their schools’ ranking. From this work the authors found that:
Analyzing rankings as a form of disciplinary power reveals that rankings, through
processes of surveillance and normalization, change how internal and external
constituencies think about the field of legal education. These new understandings of legal
education, in turn, encourage schools to self-impose the discipline that rankings foster
(Sauder & Espeland, 2009)

They go on to say that rankings compel law schools to meet the demands of outside
audiences, while also illustrating how “coercive disciplinary pressures devolve into forms
of ‘self-management’,” where school officials simultaneously reject and embrace the
rankings.
A hallmark measurement embedded in law school rankings is selectivity, as
measured by number applicants versus seats available for the incoming class. Like the
colleges described in Hoxby’s work, the emphasis on this particular definition of
selectivity distracts from other positive attributes of these law schools and their programs.
The rankings impose a specific discourse about law school quality and obstruct any other
display of programmatic strengths, improvements, nor do they give programs the
opportunity to address perceived weaknesses. The authors found that even when schools
were rewarded with a positive increase in their ranking, the celebration was only brief
before they began to panic about the possibility of falling from their new perch (Sauder &
Espeland, 2009). The most important takeaway from Sauder and Espeland’s work is that
what the rankings really do is show us the “capacity [of schools] to internalize external
pressures, whether because of the anxiety they produce or the allure they possess”
(Sauder & Espeland, 2009).
Sauder and Espeland’s work is particularly relevant for my study because the
experience of law schools rankings is most nearly replicated, perhaps even exaggerated,
in New York City high schools; they are worth quoting at length to make a clear
connection between the law school and NYC high school experience:
By imposing a shared metric on law schools, rankings unite and objectify organizations,
reinforcing their coherence as similar objects… erod[ing] the boundaries that define law
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schools’ specialized niches, while at the same time establishing precise differences
among schools based on an abstract, universal scale.

This research expertly exposes the contradiction inherent in ranking systems that force
schools to adhere to similar standards even as they demand and reward extraordinary
difference. Schools that question this obvious contradiction risk the favor of the
organizations that ranks schools, thus risking their school’s reputation, ranking metrics,
like selectivity and, perhaps even at the individual level, their job. Saunder an Espeland’s
work in law schools provides a framework for this study, which may serve as a
foundation for a larger scale study that more closely follows their methodology of deeply
examining individual schools.
In applying their findings to New York, we begin in the Directory of NYC High
Schools, where information about each high school is meant to take up only one page;
this page follows a uniform format and provides the audience with the same pieces of
information about each school. Some schools receive an additional page if they provide
multiple program options that each have their own application process. From 2009 to
2013, a major feature of the Directory of NYC High Schools is each high school’s
Progress Report and accountability rankings. These pieces became more prominently
displayed over the years on the schools directory page, moving from a less visible place
on the page in the 2009-2010 application year to the top right corner of each page in the
2012-2013 school year. Over the years the accountability measures have included the
school’s overall Progress Report letter grade, letter grades for each of the subcategories
within the Progress Report (student progress, student performance, school environment,
and college and career readiness), followed by the school’s graduation rate and postsecondary enrollment rate, both displayed as percentages. The Progress Report is an
accountability tool on the part of the Department of Education, but it also serves as a
ranking tool for the public. The Progress Report and other accountability tools, like the
Quality Review, as public documents, are utilized by major rankings publishers
nationally, U.S. News and World Report, and more locally, the New York Post’s and New
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York Daily News’ annual NYC high school rankings as well as Clara Hemphill’s New
York City's Best Public High Schools: A Parents' Guide, currently in its fourth edition.1
In this way, the annual ranking of New York City high schools has become a
political spectacle, while also effecting change through Espeland & Saunder’s concept of
“reactivity” (Edelman, 1996; Espeland & Saunder, 2007). Each year when the school
rankings are released there is a great deal of pomp and circumstance. In New York City
the local rankings are typically released within two weeks of the first round of high
school fairs, a major event covered by local news, where eighth grade applicants have an
opportunity to meet and greet faculty and students from every New York City public high
school. The rankings draw a great deal of media coverage and school principals are
contacted with press releases of their ranking. The spectacle is political in the sense that it
provides legitimacy to the accountability measures imposed on schools by the
Department of Education and thus the government, while also lending fodder to other
political agendas that implicate schools: union contracts, shifts in leadership, which
schools have risen or fallen in the ranks and speculation about why etc. In the case of a
rising rank, schools may choose to broadcast their newfound status to parents, students,
donors, and partner organizations, but in the wake of a falling ranking, principals may
face a school community looking for answers.
In an earlier study conducted by Espeland & Saunder, they found that the release of
rankings caused schools to develop a sense of “reactivity--the idea that people change
their behavior in reaction to being evaluated, observed, or measured” (Espeland &
Saunder, 2007). They argue that “…reactions to rankings are best understood as the
evolving responses of an assortment of actors who struggle to reconcile their sense of
themselves as professional educators with an imposed market-based logic of
accountability.” Their work in reactivity to rankings asks the field to more closely and
systematically examine how these public measures effect change, both intended and
unintended, in individual schools and in the larger system.
While Sauder and Espeland’s work clearly gives weight to the need for my study in
the high school choice landscape of New York City, their methods also make the case for

1 Ms. Hemphill is the founder of insideschools.org, which provides information about NYC public schools. She is
the Director of Education Policy at the New School’s Center for New York City Affairs.
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the overall framework of my study, both the qualitative and quantitative portions. They
prove that it is necessary to examine data on rankings and to “look inside organizations to
understand how meaning is negotiated and sense-making takes place” in the face of a
rankings culture.
Medical School Match Model Literature:
The medical school match model, officially called the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP), is used to help hospital residency programs match with
medical school graduates. This is a two-sided market where graduates can list their
preferences for a residency and residency-training programs can outline their criteria and
preferences for candidates. Both sides of the market submit their preferences to a
computer-based algorithm that matches graduates with residency programs, ensuring that
matches continue until nearly all graduates have been matched and residency-training
program spots have been filled (NRMP, 2015). The algorithm for computing these
matches was developed by economists Atı̇ la Abdulkadı̇ roğlu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin
E. Roth. Although there have been lawsuits brought against the NRMP, these lawsuits do
not reflect a critique of the match process, but rather what happens to residents once they
are in their residencies.
As part of the Children First Reforms, the Klein administration implemented a
new high school admissions process in 2002. After one year, however, it was clear that
the process needed revision: the first round of matches matched only approximately half
the 8th grade population, leaving 30,000 students unmatched, necessitating additional
rounds of matches with equally poor rates of success. To manage this issue, in May of
2003, the then NYC DOE Office of Strategic Planning leader, Jeremy Lack, contacted the
creators of the medical school match algorithm to see if their algorithm could be used to
match eighth graders with high schools in New York City. Together, they established the
process that exists today and in its first year of operation narrowed the number of
students without a match after the first round, down to 3,000.
In today’s process, like the medical school match, both students and schools
record their preferences. Students complete a form that requires them to rank up to twelve
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high school programs they would like to attend, placing their first preference in the
number one slot, second preference in the number two slot and so on; the preferences
listed on this form are manually entered into a computer system called the Program
Candidate List (PCL) by the student’s guidance counselor. The PCL provides receiving
schools with a host of information about the student-applicant including their grades,
designation as general or special education, standardized test scores, and attendance
record. If a student is applying to a screened school or program the program will have the
ability to review application materials and then rank students in the PCL; schools can
rank up to seven hundred student-applicants.
The creators of the NYC high school matching program have written extensively
about the development of the process (Abdulkadıroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005), as well as
the alterations made to improve matches, dealing with oversubscription to particular
schools, reducing the number of unmatched students, and designing a more efficient
appeals process for unmatched students (Abdulkadıroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2009). The
NYC DOE has stated that the Children First high school admissions process is a “work in
progress” (Hemphill & Nauer, 2009). The process has undergone minor revisions over
the years that do not necessarily alter the process itself, but have attempted to improve the
inner workings of the process.
The most groundbreaking changes to the high school matching process have come
in the form of transparency of process on the school-side of the market, in reaction to a
2013 audit by the then Deputy Comptroller, Tina Kim (2013). The audit made nine
recommendations that were mostly about internal practices, but the most publicly visible
recommendation that was put into place, was about screened school ranking criteria and
rubrics. In the 2013-2014 school year, screened schools were required to submit to the
DOE, the rubric they use to rank student applicants, per the Deputy Comptrollers report.
It was anticipated that those rubrics would be vetted by the Department and included in
the high school directory, in some way, for the use of middle school students beginning
the high school application process. While vetting of the rubrics and periodic audits of
screened programs, have been enacted, making rubrics accessible to student applicants
has been uneven. In 2014 the Directory of NYC High Schools began to include a section
called “Selection Criteria” for screened school program pages; this selection criteria list
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aligns with the rubric criteria schools submit and internal data generated by the DOE, but
if a student, counselor or parent wants to see the school’s ranking rubric, they are still left
on their own, to make this request of individual schools. This is a degree of regulation in
the process that has heretofore not been seen and reflects the changing values put forth by
a new Department of Education chancellor, as well as a new mayor, although we need
more time to see how these changes impact the process.
It should be noted that a major difference between the medical school match
process and the high school admissions process is one of maturity, access to information
and strategy. The participants in the medical school match process are all adults making
mostly rational choices for themselves that hopefully include honest self-appraisals and
strategic planning; medical school graduates also input their own preferences into the
algorithm. As graduates of medical school and administrators of hospital residency
programs, the adults participating are all highly educated individuals who are likely to be
successful in life even if no match is made. To contrast, the high school admissions
process dictates the future for thirteen and fourteen year old students, the vast majority of
whom come from low-income backgrounds, have varying levels of interest and
motivation to complete the process and have limited access to information about each of
the four hundred high schools with over seven hundred programs. Unlike their medical
school counterparts, these eighth grade students require the support of an adult to
navigate the process and input their preferences; adults who, themselves may have
varying degrees of understanding of the process and ability to provide meaningful
support.
II. Theoretical Framework
Theorizing Foucauldian Governmentality into the Neoliberal World
In creating this study I am interested in uncovering how the implementation of the
high school admissions process, in screened school-programs, has reshaped the daily and
annual work of school personnel. The implementation of this process is one example of
how the work of school-program personnel is changing, as public education becomes
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increasingly marketized. We are at a critical point in the history of U.S. public education
as neoliberal reforms struggle to fully take hold of the system. As such, there are adults
involved in the U.S. public education system who have experience with the school
system prior to the implementation of market strategies and those for whom
marketization has been the way of life. My understanding is that as market-model
reforms are implemented in public school systems, administrators, faculty and staff must
adjust their understanding of school and, if market reforms are to be successful, these
participants must also internalize the values and goals of market reforms. I glean these
ideas from scholars who have theorized Foucault’s concept of governmentality into the
neoliberal era. Although I could discuss Foucault’s ideas at length here, I will just review
the scholars who have theorized on neoliberal governmentality and discuss how that
relates to my proposed study.
The leading scholar on neoliberalism, David Harvey demonstrates the ways that
neoliberalism introduced new discourse and discursive practices into American society.
Harvey cites that “neoliberals redefined democracy as choice in the marketplace and
freedom as a personal freedom to consume… Private property is sacrosanct. Competitive
individualism is a virtue and personal accountability replaces government responsibility
for collective social welfare… the neoliberal project is not only to change how we think,
but who we are” (as cited in Lipman, 2011, p. 11). The ideas of democracy as choice and
freedom to consume, when matched with personal accountability speak largely to the
way that governmentality works in the neoliberal society and the kind of school that is
shaped by and succeeds in the neoliberal economy.
Nancy Fraser, a scholar who has attempted to expand Foucault’s governmentality
into the neoliberal economy, claims that neoliberal governmentality creates a worker who
is an “actively responsible agent… who is obligated to enhance her quality of life through
her own decisions [and is] responsible for managing her own human capital to maximal
effect” (Fraser, 2009, p. 127 emphasis added). Similar to Harvey’s quote above, personal
accountability for one’s own economic survival is key in the neoliberal economy as
competition becomes deeply entrenched. In New York City public high schools, this
survival and competition is expressed through accountability measures such as progress
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reports and quality reviews but is also controlled by the schools through their admissions
and marketing strategies.
Peters & Besley (2007) label the worker that Fraser and Harvey describe as the
“enterprising-self,” an idea that can also be applied to schools undergoing marketization.
The enterprising self is a worker who learns to be flexible in the economy and is able to
easily refashion their skills for the needs of the market place “through various forms of
personal investment and insurance in a range of welfare fields—health, education,
retraining—that are necessary both as a safeguard against risk but also as the
preconditions for participation in a competitive society” (p. 142). These discursive
actions place all accountability for success in the marketplace on the shoulders of
individual workers; or in our case, on the shoulders of individual schools. The emphasis
on individualism and competition eliminate criticism of the process because there is no
acknowledgement that individual workers have unequal opportunities or access to
education that will inhibit their ability to be competitive.
School choice reforms encourage schools to develop an enterprising-self that can
create and engage in marketing practices, and develop and implement an admissions
process (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). As per neoliberal policies, both of these key
elements are largely unregulated (Jennings, 2010) and are high-stakes in that they
contribute to a school’s accountability measures and therefore survival in the market
(Siskin, 2010; Gewirtz, Bowe & Ball, 2005). To cultivate a school-wide enterprising-self
also requires the administrators, faculty and staff to internalize the goals of a marketized
school: meet or exceed accountability measures and attract and select applicants that will
help meet those goals. As discussed above, there is no acknowledgement that schools
have unequal opportunities to compete in the market; schools do not typically have a lineitem in their budget for marketing or admissions work, nor do they all have principals or
staff that can expertly market the school or evaluate the effectiveness of admissions
processes. Further, the system does not acknowledge that school communities may be
internalizing or rejecting this process unevenly both within and between schools.
Screened school-programs in New York City are particularly likely to develop a
strong enterprising-self since they are given full control over their admissions processes
and have as much control over their marketing strategies as other school-programs, both
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of which create their ability to survive in the market. This enterprising-self can manifest
through faculty and staff willingness to take on additional tasks outside of their
collectively-bargained contract, sometimes for free (also outside of the contract) and
always “for the good of the school,” as one interview participant described to me. As
discussed earlier, there is a lack of scholarship that reflects the school-agency perspective
in a school choice setting. The goal of this study is to answer a version of Saunder &
Espeland’s call to action that we create new scholarship that seeks to systematically
understand how developing an enterprising-self is experienced and understood by
administrators, faculty and staff, as they do or do not internalize the values and goals of
the marketized school system; leaving some to thrive and others to wither in this new
system.
To reflect this framework for understanding the ways that marketization has
reshaped the work of school-program personnel, as it relates to the implementation of the
high school admissions process in New York City, I have incorporated Foucauldian
elements into my research design, relying most heavily on discourse analysis. I use
discourse analysis from participant interviews with screened school-program personnel to
understand how they construct their understanding of school with special regard to
market reforms. Further, I use discourse analysis as a way to uncover how school
personnel experience the phenomenon of admissions processes and marketing strategies
as they become of growing importance to their accountability measures.
Summary of Chapter 2
This chapter reiterates the research questions and provides the relevant research
and theoretical framework used to establish the need for this study. Here I outline five
areas of literature that solidified my understanding of the stakes of high school
admissions process for “screened” school-programs in New York City and the impact of
marketization on individual labor. These are expertly captured by Foucault’s concept of
governmentality, especially by those scholars who have theorized Foucault’s
governmentality into the neoliberal economy. This theory, along with the research of
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Saunder & Espeland, has helped me to establish a methodology for conducting the
research, discussed in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Upon beginning this study, I sought to answer the questions: How has the work of
school professionals been redefined by the implementation of the high school admissions
process? How has redefinition impacted the nature and role of the work of school
professionals, if any redefinition exists? Based on my own experiences working in
screened school-programs and talking with colleagues from other screened schoolprograms, my hypothesis was that the work of administrators, teachers, and other staff in
screened high school-programs has been redefined as a result of the implementation of
the admissions policy. Their daily work now includes tasks related to the admissions
process that are not directly related to supporting the education of students who currently
attend their school and that they would not be engaged in, if not for the admissions
policy. The effects of redirecting staff energy and work towards the admissions process
may reach beyond the individuals who actually complete the admissions work and may
divert these staff from serving their current students and families. To test my hypothesis,
I used the research design and methods described below.
I. Research Design: An Overview
To mirror the framework set forth by Saunder & Espeland (2009), I gathered data
in two parts: first, a quantitative analysis of the public data provided by the New York
City Department of Education on OpenNYC, and drawing most heavily from The
Directory of NYC High Schools on screened school-programs; and second, using the
quantitative data to guide participant selection and interview questions, a qualitative
analysis of one-on-one interviews with ten personnel working in three screened high
school-programs across New York City. By collecting data in two parts, I was able to
establish that the phenomenon of marketization, as it is described in the literature, does
exist in screened high school-programs, analyze larger trends among screened schoolprograms as they develop an enterprising-self, while also contextualizing those trends
using the lived experiences of ten personnel who participate in the admissions process at
their high school-program as part of their daily and annual work. Further, the quantitative
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findings of the admissions criteria for each school-program are illuminated as the
professionals in these programs describe the ways that their work life is impacted by
having to engage in tasks associated with the admissions process; the goal was to
humanize those processes so that the real labor of the admissions process was no longer
obscured.
II. Data Sources and Data Collection
Part I: Analysis of the Directory of New York City High Schools, 2007 & 2017
Data sourcing and collection for the first phase of this research involved a
thorough examination of all screened school-programs from two high school directories:
the 2008 Directory of New York City High Schools to examine 2007 data on screened
school-programs and the 2017 Directory of New York City High Schools, to examine
2016 data on screened school-programs, heretofore identified as the Directory or
Directories. The Directory is a phone book sized book given to all seventh grade students
in New York City public schools in the spring of seventh grade. Each student receives
one copy of the book and the book provides a one-page description of every high schoolprogram that they can apply to in the fall semester of eighth grade. Each description
includes many pieces of data on the school-program and its admissions process, and is
uniform from page to page, despite the many differences among school-programs. The
use of the 2008 and 2017 Directories is important because for each school-program, the
Directory provides statistics from the previous year’s admissions process. I chose to use
2007 and not 2006 data because the version of the admissions process that largely exists
today was solidified in 2006, in time for the 2007 school year admissions process. This
makes my analysis just shy of a decade’s worth of data on screened school-programs in
New York City. To fill gaps in the Directory data, I also used public data from
OpenNYC, which provides datasets from many city agencies, including the NYC
Department of Education, for public use. The data collected from OpenNYC was the
Progress Report and Quality Review scores of all screened school-programs from 2007 to
2017, where available; this data was not always provided in the Directory but had
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important implications for the study, as these scores often play a role in attracting
applicants and competing with other school-programs.
From these two directories and the OpenNYC data, I created a dataset of the 210
screened school-programs that existed between the two school years. Only schoolprograms using the “screened” admissions method were entered into the dataset; schoolprograms that were “screened for language,” “audition” or a student’s length of time
living in the United States, were excluded from the dataset. The dataset variables include
basic identifying information and information from each school-program’s page that is
relevant to examining the work that professionals in those high school-programs do once
an applicant submitted an application package or began to engage in the application
process beyond simply ranking a school-program. For example, if a school-program
requires that students submit a writing sample as part of their application, that writing
sample has to be collected and evaluated and a score for that writing sample has to be
added to the student’s application file, all completed by personnel from the high schoolprogram; as such I created a variable called “REQ1_07” and “REQ1_16” to denote if the
school-program had a particular admissions requirement listed on its Directory page.
Each variable included a 2007 version of the variable and a 2016 version of the variable
to show the differences over the span of the existence of the school program.
Aside from basic identifying information about each school-program, the
variables for this dataset include: whether the school-program existed in 2007 and 2016,
its admissions method (only screened school-programs were considered for the dataset,
although some changed their admissions method between 2007 and 2016), whether it had
a website separate from the DOE provided “School Portal,” if the school-program
allowed visits for applicants and the posted frequency of those visits, its geographic
priorities and preferences for continuing 8th graders, the number of freshman seats open
the previous school year, the number of applications the school received the previous
school year, the admissions requirements for grades in each of the four core subject areas
and preferred scores on the state 7th grade English Language Arts (ELA) and Math
exams, the types of application materials or tasks a school-program required that year, the
most recent Progress Report grade and Quality Review score for the school-program in
each of those years.
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Using these basic variables, collected directly from the High School Directory
page of each school-program or OpenNYC, I was able to create new, descriptive and
analytical variables. For example, using the variables that identified the number of
freshman seats available the previous year and the number of applicants to the program
that same year, I was able to create the new variable: “PCT_SEL_FRSH07” and
“PCT_SEL_FRSH16,” by dividing the number of seats by the number of applicants to
each school-program and multiplying by 100 to uncover the school-program’s percent
selectivity for that year. This variable allowed me to test the concepts presented in both
Hoxby and Pascarella and Terenzini’s work, demonstrating the importance of such a
measure in attracting applicants and measuring institutional quality, perceived or real.
This variable proved to be very useful. From this variable I was also able to create
additional variables that linked selectivity to a school-program’s geographic priorities,
scores on accountability measures, use of a website, allowance and frequency of visits,
and the kinds of grades, state test scores and admissions requirements or tasks applicants
need to engage in.
There were some challenging aspects of compiling this dataset that warrant
further discussion: the size of the dataset, missing data, discontinued programs, new
programs, composite scores, and changes in the information provided by the Directory of
New York City High Schools from year to year. Although there were 167 screened
school-programs in 2007 and 161 in 2017, the size of the dataset for each year made the
use of any statistical tests beyond data description, univariate, and some bivariate tests,
challenging in terms of reliability and validity. When I created new variables that
represented a subset of school-programs, the number of cases was often too small to be
generally accepted as valid or reliable; the typical threshold for number of cases when
using tests of significance is 121 cases or more, while many of my attempted statistical
tests had between 40 and 80 cases (Healy, 2009). In several instances, I attempted to use
SPSS to conduct statistical testing, but even when variables were standardized and usable
for such tests, the number of cases simply made the concluded statistical significance
unreliable. This was an unanticipated challenge of the dataset, and as a result, the data are
purely for descriptive purposes of screened school-programs rather than for testing
statistical significance.
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Missing data was most consistently a challenge on determining the availability
of visits and their frequency, where frequency of visits was the least often provided piece
of information of the two; in 2007, 25% of screened school-programs did not provide
information about the availability nor the frequency of visits and in 2017, that percentage
increased to 59%. Additionally, in 2007 and 2017, 2.4% of school-programs did not
identify a preferred grade range and/or state exam score and/or some combination of the
two for potential applicants. Although the percentage of school-programs falling into this
category remained the same between the years, it was not the same school-programs each
year.
Programs that existed in 2007 also did not necessarily exist in 2017. A part of the
Children’s First Initiative that was not mentioned in the literature review, was Bloomberg
and Klein’s desire to dismantle and reconfigure large high schools into smaller schools,
funded largely by the Gates Foundation; 96% of the screened school-programs that were
lost from 2007 to 2017 were from large high schools (n=46). In their place, 43 new
programs were created, some of which returned to those large high schools, but many of
which were actually new, small, screened school-programs. At times, this loss made
comparisons between years challenging, although the overall number of screened-school
programs remained stable, where there were 167 screened school-programs in 2007 and
161 screened school-programs in 2017.
To compensate for changing and sometimes infrequent accountability measures, I
had to either yield to missing data or create composite scores for the Quality Review
variables, which sought to provide the most recent Quality Review score for each schoolprogram for 2007 and 2017. For the 2007 Quality Review variable, it was DOE policy at
the time, that the period between Quality Reviews was contextual; if a school had a
Quality Review the previous year, they may be exempt from having one the next year;
however, if a school received a lower rating the previous year, they may have at Quality
Review the following year. Since the presence of a Quality Review ratings depended on a
variety of factors, I chose to enter “Missing Data” for these schools that did not have
Quality Review data for 2007.
This is similar to the challenge presented by the 2017 Quality Review score,
which I chose to make a composite score, a variable created just for this piece. In 2007,
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the DOE provided an overall average Quality Review score for each school-program.
However, as of 2013, this practice was discontinued in favor of providing schoolprograms the scores they earned in each category of the Quality Review. I created a
composite overall score by averaging the scores earned in each of the five areas that are
evaluated, and rounding up or down, to allow for comparison between the 2007 rating
and the 2016 rating. The categories that are rated, and the process for rating the Quality
Review, has changed between 2007 and 2017, rendering the category scores for 2007
different and therefore, incomparable. Providing a single rating for both years by creating
a composite rating for 2017 was the closest I could come to making a comparable
accountability measure. If a school has a rating of zero, it is because that school did not
have a Quality Review from 2013-2016.
This is also similar to the challenge of the 2017 Progress Report variable. The
practice of providing every school program with a letter grade via the School Progress
Report, was discontinued in 2013 with a change in the mayoral administration. However,
this accountability measure was widely used for the majority of the years this study
covers. As such, the Progress Report score used for 2017 was the most recent Progress
Report score provided to the school in the 2013-2014 school year. Although this score is
somewhat dated, for this study, it still demonstrates another measure of accountability
that spanned several years and can be used to measure the school-program against its
admissions processes.
Another change in the data from 2007 to 2017 was the breakdown of Freshman
applicants and seats by special education and general education status. In 2007, the
Directory page for each school-program identifies the number of Freshman seats
available in the program and the number of applicants to that school-program. However,
the 2017 Directory provides the number of Freshman applicants and seats to each schoolprogram broken out by General Education students and Special Education students. To
make comparable variables, I allowed the 2007 data to stand and made the 2017 data
similar by combining the number of General Education seats with the number of Special
Education seats, to get a total number of Freshman seats available for the year and then
doing the same for the total number of Freshman applicants for the year.
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The final challenge of this data was presented to me during the second half of data
collection in interviews: accuracy of information provided in the Directory. Four of the
interview participants discussed misleading or inaccurate information in the Directory
about their school-program. These issues included inaccurate applicant numbers from the
previous year and incorrect or changed admissions tasks. Two participants cited the lag
time between when information was collected and when the Directory was published, as
much as 12 months in advance of publication, as part of the problem. At a Fordham Law
School Conference in November 2016, Office of Enrollment staff, who assemble the
Directory, cited that information is collected as early as 18 months in advance of
publication and publication often happens in February of the school year of distribution,
with translated versions printed by May of that same school year.
The goals of compiling this dataset were as follows:
1. Test the hypothesis that indeed screened school-programs meet the
foundational criteria of becoming marketized, as the process is
described in the literature, and that this process is specifically
happening within the admissions process. This occurred by examining
the presence of the factors of marketization and developing an
enterprising-self that were described in the literature in New York
City’s screened high school-programs. These factors include a focus on
“selling” the school-program, and working to support all of the factors
that have an impact on the selectivity of the school and perceived
institutional quality, which may include rankings and accountability
measures.
2. Provide descriptive statistics on screened school-programs as they
relate to the process of being marketized and identify patterns and
trends in the high school admissions process of screened schoolprograms that may generate tasks for the professionals working in these
high school-programs, outside the normal boundaries of their job
description. This included testing the relevance of particular variables
that were derived from the literature that I relied on to design the study.
While the challenges discussed above did require skillful maneuvering
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of data, I believe that the steps I took to ensure the validity of the data
still yielded accurate descriptive statistics about those variables.
3. The third and most important use of this dataset was to establish criteria
and then the selection process for eligible candidates to interview, who
would be able to discuss the widest possible array of marketization
processes within their school-program. The dataset was also intended to
support the development of interview questions for the second part of
the data collection: interviews with professionals who work in
screened-school programs and have some hand in their schoolprogram’s admissions process.
Part II: Interviews with Personnel in Screened High Schools
Using my analysis of the dataset described above in conjunction with my review
of relevant literature that examines how admissions processes, and similar policies, can
cause changes in the defined work of professionals in academic institutions, I developed
inclusion and exclusion criteria for participation in interviews and questions that would
contextualize the Directory dataset. To be eligible to participate in the study, potential
participants had to be currently working in, or formerly working in, a screened high
school-program in New York City public schools with no geographic priority for
admission. They must have been employed in that high school-program anytime from the
2006-2007 school year to the 2016-2017 school year. Participants could be teachers,
guidance counselors, administrators, office staff or other school personnel, but needed to
have some knowledge of their school-program's admissions process.
Three key informants at three screened school-programs were recruited initially as
respondents to a “call for participants” which was distributed to education list-servs
throughout higher education institutions in New York City, and provided an entry point
into each school-program. Each respondent to the “call for participants” was screened for
eligibility and, if eligible, invited to an interview. This sample of school personnel was
recruited using a snowball sampling strategy in which the key consulting personnel at
each school-program (Peaches, Jane and Chip) facilitated recruitment. Ultimately, the
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interview portion of this study examined the work of ten professionals across three
screened school-programs, who each have intimate knowledge of their school-program’s
admissions process and whose daily, seasonal and annual work is altered by the
implementation of the process. Participant information can be found in Table 3.1; they,
for the most part, reflect the broader population of NYC public school employees (NYC
Independent Budget Office, 2016). All three school-programs are screened, have been in
existence since 2007 and all three school-programs have no geographic priority for
admission, meaning students from all five boroughs may apply to the school-program.
This part of the data collection included ten one-on-one, semi-structured, audiorecorded interviews with teachers, administrators and school staff who work(ed) in
screened high school-programs across New York City, sometime in the designated time
frame, 2007-2017. The interviews took place either at the CUNY Graduate Center or a
private location selected by the interviewee and lasted between 50 and 80 minutes each.
The interviews focused on their daily work, their work in the admissions process and/or
how the work of the admissions process has impacted their day-to-day tasks. The
interviews were then transcribed, coded and analyzed using fourteen categories. These
categories reflect behaviors and attitudes identified by Espeland and Saunder's (2007)
understanding of governmentality in academic institutions and general trends in the
experiences of those working in screened school-programs.
The focus of these coding categories was how these professionals interpret the
admissions process in their school-program, but also the extent to which they have
internalized and normalized the process, its accompanying competition and workload that
may otherwise not be part of their professional work. I approach the concepts of
internalization and normalization from the example set forth by Espeland and Saunder
(2007) and Saunder and Espeland (2009). In their studies, they allowed, and argued, that
the behaviors and attitudes of professionals are an indicator of normalization and
internalization of law school rankings. As regarded and peer-reviewed studies, I felt that
this was an appropriate standard to hold my own work to, by using certain types of
behaviors and attitudes to define normalization and internalization of both the admissions
process, the competition it engenders and the work it has redefined. In both studies, the
scholars looked at behaviors and attitude that exemplified the allure and anxiety behind
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being part of law school rankings as evidence of internalization and normalization.
Following their example, I chose to examine the changes in daily work, professional
culture and school community to point to shifting identities and demonstrate how
individuals have internalized and normalized aspects of admissions and competition.
I do not claim to be an expert in psychology nor the discipline’s definitions of
internalization and normalization. Rather, I have approached these concepts, like Saunder
and Espeland, using the theoretical framework of neoliberal governmentality that
demands that individuals, or in this case school-programs and professionals, take on the
responsibilities and burdens accompanying the development of their own capital around
any given process that may have otherwise been the burden of the government, or Central
DOE, in previous policy periods. In this case, my use of these concepts is to demonstrate
how professionals in school-programs take on the responsibilities of admissions and
competition, and reconcile their traditional professional identities against the need to
compete in a system that will allow them to fail if they do not successfully internalize and
normalize the process. I can appreciate a criticism of my use of the concepts of
internalization and normalization, however they do fall in line with the literature on
marketization and how that process has impacted the functioning of public goods and
services in the neoliberal economy.
My goal in this portion of the data analysis was to uncover how the
administrators, faculty and staff construct and experience the phenomenon of admissions
processes and marketing strategies and how that has challenged their professional
identities, daily work, and professional cultures; ultimately trying to examine the redefinition of their work. In using an embedded case study, I aimed to honor the
contextual quality of actual school-program communities while allowing for an
examination of commonalities among and between participants (Fishman, 1999;
Watanabe, 2007). Descriptive statistics on each school-program community, derived
from the Directory dataset, can be found at the start of Chapter 4.
The goals of this data were as follows:
1. Richly describe the admissions process of each school-program and the
work of personnel who are tasked with implementing the admissions
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process in their school-program; this process simultaneously matched
their work to the factors of marketization described in the literature.
2. Examine the ways that personnel involved in the admissions process
interpret, internalize, normalize or resist the process of marketization
and the changes in the daily and annual work that are specific to the
admissions process.
3. Humanize the process of admissions away from the algorithm
developed out of the medical school-matching model, to theorize the
impacts of this process on school-program communities, the hidden
labor of the admission process and how traditional professional
identities are challenged by participation in this process.
Table 3.1. Participant Descriptions
School-Program
Participant
(High School or
Name*
Program)
Mango
Established
Individualist
(High School)

Peaches
Isabel

Angelica

Administrator (15)
Director of Admissions
(3)
Former Administrator
(7)
Personnel (8)

John

Former Teacher (8)

Daenerys

Administrator (10)

Chip

Administrator (3)

Lulu

Administrator (5)

Junot

Teacher (5)

Jane
Quiet Secret
(High School)

Passionate
Underdog
(Program
within a High
School)

Official Position**
(Number of Years in
this Position at this
School-Program)
Volunteer (7)

Main Participation in
School’s Admissions
Process
Admissions Committee
Member
Selecting Final Applicants
Coordinating Entire
Admissions Process
Reviewing Applications
Coordinating Entire
Admissions Process
Admissions Committee
Member
Reviewing Applications
Admissions Committee
Member
Coordinating Entire
Admissions Process
Reviewing Applications

*All participant names are pseudonyms and positions are generalized to protect the privacy of participants
and their schools.
**All participants were an active part of the school community at the time of data collection in
Spring/Summer 2017, unless denoted as “former.” Those who are “former” members of the school
community worked in the school community at some point from 2007 to 2016.
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Chapter Summary
Chapter 3 reiterates the research question and hypothesis, and goes on to describe
the processes by which data were collected for this study. Part I provides an overview of
the data collection process and its origins in the literature. Part II describes the process I
used for creating a quantitative dataset on screened high school-programs in New York
City, descriptions of the variables included in the dataset and how certain missing
variables were created; this section also describes some limitations of the dataset and how
those impacted the use of the dataset. Lastly, Part II lists the goals of the creation of the
dataset. Part III describes the methods for creating the qualitative portion of this
research—interviews with personnel at screened high school-programs in NYC. Here I
demonstrate the ways that the Directory dataset guided the framework and questions for
the interviews, the inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, and the coding
categories used to analyze the interview data. I also include an important difference
between the psychological concepts of internalization and normalization against the ways
these concepts have been used to understand the impacts of neoliberal governmentality
and then a list of the goals of this data. Finally I include Table 3.1, which describes each
of the participants in the interviews.
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE DATA FINDINGS
Quantitative Findings Overview
Despite the challenges and limitations of this dataset, presented in Chapter 3, the
Directory dataset does provide many interesting insights that support the literature on
marketization of public goods, selectivity, rankings and accountability measures, and
school choice policy. From this dataset, I conclude in Part I of this chapter, that screened
school-programs are increasingly experiencing the phenomenon of marketization and
engaging in practices that move them towards developing an “enterprising-self” (Fraser,
2009; Peters & Besley, 2007). In Parts II & III of this chapter, I conclude that overall
selectivity of screened school-programs has increased from 2007 to 2017 and that with
selectivity, a whole host of other measures have meaningfully changed to increase the
workload of the personnel in screened school-programs. Among these changes are the
increased use of labor-intensive admissions processes, and an increase of scores on
formal accountability measures for the most highly selective school-programs. These
findings show that Hoxby (2009) and then Pascarella and Terenzini’s (2005) assertions
that colleges with longer established histories of selectivity benefit most from the
competition between school-programs, is also true in screened high school-programs in
New York City. Additionally, using interview quotes to contextualize the dataset
findings, I show that the labor of the admissions process and maintaining selectivity
pushes personnel towards competing, and sometimes conflicting, professional identities
(Lundstrom & Holm, 2011).
One area of the literature that was not illuminated by this dataset was the literature
on the medical school-matching model, as it relates to the high school admissions
process. This is partly due to the fact that the dataset focuses on Directory data that
influences the work of professionals in the receiving high school-programs, rather than
the inner workings of the algorithm that ultimately matches students and school-programs
or the choice process of individual students. The medical school match model literature
did come to bear on the results of this study, but were exclusively in the data from
participant interviews, discussed in Chapter 5.
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Table 4.1 shows that the number of screened programs has decreased slightly, by
seven programs, in the decade since the admissions process was implemented; there have
been several programs that have started and ended in the time between 2007 and 2017,
but overall, the number has only slightly decreased. Of the 161 screened school-programs
that exist in 2017, 119 of those programs have been in existence since, or prior to, 2007,
nearly 75% of the screened school-programs have remained stable in their existence.
Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens have had the most consistent supply of screened
school-programs; proportionately, Manhattan has the most screened school-programs to
stay intact, relative to the overall number in 2017.
Table 4.1. Number of Screened School-Programs, 2007 & 2017 and 2007-2017.
Borough
Number of
Number of
Number of Screened
Screened
Screened
School-Programs That
Programs in 2007
Programs in
Remained in Place from
2017
2007-2017
Bronx
25
17
10
Brooklyn
46
51
35
Manhattan
33
35
29
Queens
47
45
33
Staten Island
16
13
12
TOTAL
167
161
119
COUNT
I. Marketization
According to Peters & Besley (2007), the process of developing an enterprisingself includes the development and acquisition of resources that will allow one to be
flexible and dynamic in the new neoliberal economy. Three examples of screened schoolprograms developing an enterprising-self that can be concluded from the Directory
dataset are: the creation and maintenance of a website, allowing visits to the schoolprogram, and exercising greater control over the admissions process by using admissions
requirements that are more labor intensive.
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Website Maintenance
Although the Department of Education (DOE) provides all school-programs with
free access to a “School Portal” webpage through the main DOE website, since 2007
many screened school-programs have found it necessary to create a website separate from
the School Portal page, as seen in Table 4.2. The School Portal page has a standard
format that is used by all schools, with limited flexibility in terms of layout and
organization of information, and includes some non-negotiable information that appears
regardless of whether the school-program wants to include it. The Portal page often has a
long web address that includes the “District, Borough, Number” or DBN, of the larger
school, a number that is unlikely to be known by most students and parents and is not
necessarily specific to the program. Unlike the School Portal page, a customized website
allows the school-program to present itself in the way it would like to be perceived,
organize information in a way that is relevant to its current students and families, and
may have the capability to provide greater access to admissions processes by allowing the
school-program to post images, videos, documents and even receive admissions materials
from applicants. However, customized websites come at both a financial cost and a
human cost. The various platforms for creating websites often have “educator” discounts,
that provide access at a lower annual cost for schools than they charge for individuals, but
there is also the labor involved in building and maintaining the website. These separate
websites often used the same logos, headings, and language as that of the greater schoolprogram, maintain calendars, announcements, links to relevant websites, detailed
admissions information, specific contact information and school culture information
ranging from the academic to the extracurricular.
Interview participants pointed me to the fact that all of their School Portal pages
now direct audiences to their separate website, which in all cases, had significantly more
information on the school-program than the Portal page. In Angelica’s description of how
applicants find her school-program, she states “they’re just doing their research on the
school. I think the website plays a big part ‘cause those families have been on our
website…they’ve checked it, they’ve checked Inside Schools. These parents are doing
their homework.” Lulu echoed a similar sentiment when she discussed the importance of
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including the website address on give-away items for school fairs, such as “key chains,
pens, trinkets, like ‘swag,’ stuff that they walk away with and go ‘oh yeah, [that school],
the website is on the pen.’” But Chip, from the same school-program as Lulu, discussed
the cost of professional website design stating that they’ve “done it the cheapest way
possible, relying on my basic visual arts skills,” but that “professional website design is
expensive, but yields a better site that brings kids in.” Similarly, Jane discussed the use of
an independent website to allow applicants to sign up for school visits, “we developed a
way that you could actually sign up online right on the website… and it was really nice to
have because in the absence of that, you had a whole lot of clerical time devoted to
answering phones and making those appointments.”
The motivation to create a separate website that allows for greater control over
their school-program’s image, is a hallmark of the enterprising-self. However, in a public
system that should provide equal access and opportunity for all, the school-programs that
find a way to finance a separate website are able to distinguish themselves from the
crowd; two out of the three school-programs where I interviewed participants, told me
that they have a teacher, staff member or a parent, or some combination of those folks,
working on their school website. These adults often complete the job for a price that does
not actually meet the number of hours they spend on the work, sometimes simply
volunteering to do the work.
Table 4.2. Percentage of School-Programs Maintaining a Website by Borough, 2007 &
2017
Percentage of
Percentage of
Percentage of Screened
Screened Programs
Screened Programs
Programs that
Borough
that Maintained a
that Maintained a
Maintained a Website*
Website* in 2007
Website* in 2017
from 2007-2017
Bronx
5%
94%
50%
Brooklyn
38%
76%
34%
Manhattan
67%
86%
34%
Queens
64%
84%
67%
Staten
56%
100%
42%
Island
TOTAL
50%
84%
45%
*In this case, a website only counts if it's a website other than the DOE provided “School Portal” website.
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Visits
In the case of school-programs, another example of the development of an
enterprising-self is the willingness to open the school for visits and take on all the labor
and resources that requires. According to participant interviews, hosting visits presents
several unique challenges. This was an especially challenging logistical feat for my
participants, as all three school-programs where participants work(ed), are in buildings
that are now called a campus or complex—a former large high school that now houses
several small high school-programs. For example, Jane from the Quiet Secret schoolprogram described the need for at least four personnel to be available for the start of
every visit to manage the entry of attendees into the building: registering with front-desk
security, walking to the part of the building that houses the school-program since they are
located in an educational complex rather than a stand-alone building, and then ushering
attendees to the classroom where they would welcome prospective students and families;
all that before the visit even started. Junot and Lulu, from the Passionate Underdog
school-program, cited similar logistical challenges for hosting visits, but also stated that it
was important that the detailed choreography of those initial entry-into-the-building-steps
went smoothly, because they were an essential part of “selling” the school to applicants.
Table 4.3 shows the number of screened school-programs that explicitly
identified, on their Directory page, if they host any visits in 2007 and 2017. As was
mentioned in the Chapter 3’s discussion of challenges with the dataset, this particular
variable does have limitations, but is still worth examining since interview participants
discussed the need for visits with such fervor. In 2007 this information was frequently
provided on the Directory page in a special badge labeled “Tour” or “Open House”
information, but in 2017, those badges no longer existed on the Directory pages. Schoolprograms only identified if they host visits by listing so in their admissions requirements.
However, all three of the case study school-programs presented in this study host visits in
2017, either open houses, tours or both, but did not require them for admission. As a
result, their 2017 Directory page does not list visits as an option, even though they are
available; the assumption is that interested candidates will go to their website for this
information. This is a limitation of the 2017 data—it appears that the number of school45

programs hosting visits has decreased from 127 to 66, but in reality this may not be
accurate, especially when we take the demand for visits into account at more established
school-programs. “We do three open houses and get about 900 people at each and that’s
because we cap it, we’d probably get more…” states Isabel from the Established
Individualist school-program, which had 45 Freshman seats available in the 2016
admissions process. John from the Quiet Secret school-program recalled that “it seemed
like there were always tours coming through my classroom, maybe as many as four days
a week with twenty or so families in each.” From the same school, Daenerys recounted
two open house events that “had a little over a thousand attendees for each, maybe four
hundred and fifty families at each—they filled the auditorium.”
Table 4.3. Screened School-Program Visits 2007 & 2017, by count
Hosts Visits & Requires Visits for Admission
Hosts Visits & Has No Geographic Priority
Hosts Visits, Has No Geographic Priority & Requires Visits for
Admission
TOTAL Hosts Visits

2007
20
56
7

2017
28
19
10

127

66

Use of Labor Intensive Admissions Requirements
Lastly, school-programs also demonstrate the development of an enterprising-self
by exercising greater control over their admissions process through the use of more laborintensive admissions requirements. These admissions requirements are indeed laborious
for the student applicant, but they also generate a tremendous amount of preparation and
labor for the high school-program as well. In the participant interviews, I asked
participants to rank admissions processes by those that took the most time and labor. I
provided fifteen admissions process tasks and an “other” category for them to rank.
Based on these rankings, I determined that the three most labor-intensive admissions
requirements for screened school-programs are: interviews, writing samples and
demonstrated interest (attending an open house or school tour).
In Table 4.4, I show that the percentage of screened school-programs using these
kinds of requirements has increased from 2007 to 2017. In 2007 a quarter of screened
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school-programs used these kinds of admission requirements, but by 2017 that percentage
increased to 36%. “The most tiresome part of the job is opening all the applications, like,
physically opening them and sorting the papers; I enlist my daughters to help, I pay them
to help me just, like open the envelopes and log them,” states Isabel, showing that before
we even discuss the evaluation of application material, the very act of requesting
materials from applicants has its own labor. John “really enjoyed leading tours, but
sometimes that would be quite a bit of strain on time, [and] a very, very large amount of
time was devoted to speaking about the admissions process and ranking [student writing
samples] at our full faculty meetings.” To get to the interview process, Mango stated that
at Established Individualist, they “read close to a thousand essays” and after two months
of interviews, five days a week, the admissions committee spends three to four hours a
day for a week or two further narrowing the applicant pool as a group, before turning the
selection process over to the principal.
Table 4.4. Percentage of Screened School-Programs Using Labor Intensive Admissions
Tasks, 2007 & 2017
2007
2017
Required one of the following for admission: demonstrated
14%
19%
interest, an interview or a student work sample (math or writing)
Required a combination of the following for admission:
11%
17%
demonstrated interest, an interview and/or a student work sample
(math or writing)
Total School Programs Requiring Labor Intensive Additional
25%
36%
Step(s) by the High School in order to Evaluate Applicants
From these three examples: maintaining a website, allowing visits and using
labor-intensive admissions requirements, I concluded that indeed screened schoolprograms are moving towards developing an enterprising-self. From the interviews, I
gathered that part of the motivation for implementing these behaviors was to set them
apart from their competition, which they could often name without hesitation, and to give
them greater control over the process. These ideas are further discussed in Chapter 5,
which looks at the qualitative data collected in interviews.
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II. Establishing Selectivity
The Directory dataset variable that proved to be the most useful in marrying
relevant literature with the workload of implementing an admissions process was a
screened school-program’s percent selectivity. This variable is easily established by
calculating the number of applicants per seat, which was provided in the 2007 Directory
and was easily calculated using the data provided in the 2017 Directory (see Chapter 3
for how these variables were created). Percent selectivity is widely reported in rankings
publications and accountability documents, often weighing the most in calculating mediaproduced rankings when combined with scores on formal accountability measures. Here
in Part II, I only examine selectivity by reviewing the applicant-to-seat ratio and percent
selectivity in 2007 and 2017. Part III uses the work of other scholars to determine
additional variables that impact, or are impacted by, selectivity. Part III first reviews
geography in admissions processes and types of admissions requirements, but then I
present descriptive statistics on selectivity and other variables that the literature, and later,
my interviews, suggested I compare. These comparisons are focused on selectivity as it
relates to the work of personnel in screened school-programs who implement the
admissions process.
Table 4.5 shows that the median number of applicants per seat has increased from
2007 to 2017. Corcoran and Levin (2010) cited that the DOE felt a school had a
“healthy” demand if it had six applicants per seat. We can see that both the median and
the average number of applicants per seat is higher than that in both years. However, the
range of applicants per seat has increased by 28 applicants per seat from 2007 to 2017,
which may be interpreted as an indication that the process is becoming more competitive.
Table 4.6 shows that the median percent selectivity has decreased from 2007 to
2017, which may be a further indication that screened school-programs are becoming
more competitive to get into, even though the average percent selectivity has only risen
by 1% which suggests some stability of competition. We can also see that, while in 2017
every program had at least one applicant per seat, the range of selectivity in 2017
indicates that some programs were not able to fill all of their seats, as there could be a
122% chance of an applicant getting accepted, as opposed to a 1% chance of getting
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accepted into the school-program. This may also be interpreted as support for Pascarella
and Terenzini’s findings that, as this process stays in place, students become more likely
to expand their options for which programs they apply to, perhaps taking a leap and
pursuing programs that are further away from home or out of their comfort zone in some
way. This increases the need for programs with no geographic priority to expand their
reach, in terms of marketing themselves to middle school students who had previously
been unlikely to apply. It also prompted me to look at the changing relationship between
selectivity and accountability measures, as well as the relationship between selectivity
and geographic priority.
In Tables 4.5 and 4.6, as well as in nearly all the descriptive statistics in Part III, I
prioritize the median applicants per seat or the median percent selectivity, as there are
some school-programs that are extreme outliers within the dataset that impact the mean
or average, yielding it a less accurate descriptor of trends within applicant-to-seat ratios
and percent selectivity. For example, if a school-program was being phased out or was
slated for closure, it was not able to fill all of its seats and therefore had a very high
percent selectivity. Similarly, in 2007 there were twenty-five screened school-programs
and in 2017 there were thirty-six screened school-programs, with a percent selectivity of
5% or less, making them extraordinarily competitive; in each year, these were screened
school-programs with forty to sixty applicants per seat. These kinds of outliers, at the top
and at the bottom make the median the more appropriate number to use in comparisons,
rather than the average.
Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics on Number of Applicants per Seat, 2007 & 2017
Median
Mean
Range of
Number of
Number of
Applicants Applicants Applicants
Programs at
Programs
per Seat
per Seat
per Seat
or Below the
Above the
Median
Median
(more
(less selective)
selective)
2007
8
12
1-107
90
76
2017
10
14
1-135
82
79
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Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics on Percent Selectivity of Screened Programs, 2007 &
2017
Median
Mean
Range of
Number of
Number of
Percent
Percent
Percent
Programs Below Programs Above
Selectivity Selectivity Selectivity
the Median
the Median
(more selective)
(less selective)
2007
13%
17%
1%-92%
84
78
2017
10%
18%
1%-122%
85
75
III. Selectivity & Other Variables that Further Establish Selectivity
Hoxby and Pascarella and Terezini’s work on college selectivity demonstrates
that a few key factors can be relied on to determine not only selectivity but also
institutional quality, which impacts selectivity. These factors include a school’s:
geography, types of admissions requirements or tasks, performance on accountability
measures, and minimum course grades and exam scores of applicants. To examine these
ideas in screened school-programs, I have included tables that provide descriptive
statistics of the population of screened school-programs for each of these factors. I have
also provided tables that describe relevant comparisons of these factors as they were
relayed to me in interviews; for the most part, these comparison tables present the percent
selectivity against one of the factors listed above.
The Geographic Priority
Among the ways a screened school-program can admit applicants is by
geographic eligibility; this means that the school-program will prioritize applicants based
on where they live as a way to keep the student population “local” in some form, most
often by borough, but also by district. Any changes to a school-program’s geographic
priority for admission are ultimately made by the Central Department of Education, but
programs that have no geographic priority have a hefty task in the admissions process:
they cannot simply screen out candidates who do not meet the geographic priority. They
must review the applications of every applicant according to the more qualitative
application materials that they require in the screening process. Most often these include
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a review of course grades, attendance and/or punctuality, state exam scores and elements
such as a writing sample, interview, portfolio or other task.
There are five boroughs and thirty-two districts in New York City; in both 2007
and 2017, four of the districts had no screened school-programs: districts 28, 23, 18 and
75, although district 75 is not a geographic district, but rather one that is specially
designated for school-programs that support particular types of special needs students.
From the 2007 and 2017 Directories I created a variable that determined if a schoolprogram uses a geographic priority to determine applicant eligibility. In 2007, the
geographic priority was listed explicitly, but in 2017, the geographic priority was
expressed as the percentage of students in the previous freshman cohort who came from a
given borough or district. In both 2007 & 2017, if the school-program was open to
students from all of New York City, then it stated exactly that in the admissions criteria:
“Open to all New York City.”
Table 4.7 shows the percentage of screened school-programs using a geographic
priority or not, in both 2007 and 2017. Overall, the use of a geographic priority has
become more popular among screened-school programs, increasing from 55% of all
screened school-programs in 2007 to 60% in 2017. Manhattan and Brooklyn were the
only boroughs where screened school-programs increased their use of the “Open to all of
NYC” category, making them more accessible to students from all over the city from
2007 to 2017. On the contrary, screened school-programs in the Bronx, Staten Island and
Queens have increased their use of the geographic priority from 2007 to 2017.
Table 4.8 shows the number of screened school-programs that fall above or below
the median percent selectivity for the year (2007 or 2017) and whether or not they used a
geographic priority to screen applicants. In 2007, programs that were more selective were
more likely to have a geographic priority in the form of requiring applicants to live in the
district or borough where the school is located. Only 33, or 39% of the highly selective
school-programs had no geographic priority. The number of less selective programs with
no geographic priority was fairly even in 2007 at 51%. In 2017, the overall number of
programs that allowed students from all five boroughs to apply decreased for both highly
selective and less selective programs. Similar to 2007, in 2017, the most selective schools
were more likely to have a geographic priority built into their admissions criteria.
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As Lundstrom & Holm (2011) pointed out in their findings about the impact of
marketization on professional identities, I concluded that the geographic priority
illuminates a similar impact on screened school-program personnel in New York City.
All three screened school-programs where I drew participant interviews from, have no
geographic priority, their admissions criteria state that they are “Open to all New York
City.” Junot, Mango and Angelica, from all three school-programs, raised the issue of
accepting students from all of New York City as a challenge in the admissions process.
Each participant framed the lack of geographic priority as a challenge to some part of
their professional identity; Junot saw it as a moral high-ground against a competing
school-program, stating “well, we’re not like [name of a competing school], where they
can just filter students out by district and suddenly they go from 5,000 applicants to 600.”
Mango noted a similar kind of frustration in stating that their open status had an impact
on the school community that made participation more difficult for students, even as the
school-program attempted to fill its mission of serving all of NYC for the sake of equity:
“not all kids can stay late to work on a project or participate in sports if they have to
commute ninety minutes each way to get to us,” but “we’re glad they have the chance to
get the education they choose, that they choose us and the quality of our classrooms, over
other less-attractive options closer to home.” Angelica lamented how the “fabulous
diversity” her school-program relishes due to their open geographic priority, is lacking in
many other screened school-programs, to their detriment: “the other schools just say ‘oh,
wrong district,’ and just dismiss them!”
Hoxby noted the shifting geographic pattern of college applicants applying to
schools further from home in exchange for programmatic quality, we can see the
rationale behind the increasing use of a geographic priority for screened school-programs
in New York City. Having a geographic priority may reduce the number of applicants
who require a review of supplemental application materials, whereas school-programs
that accept students from all over New York City, have the responsibility of reviewing
supplemental application materials from all applicants, without a filter that allows them
to quickly sort applicants. This in turn generates more labor for the high school-program,
forcing them to develop competing professional identities that pit access to quality
education against a need to reduce their own workload.
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Table 4.7. Percentage of School-Programs Using the Geographic Priority, by Borough,
2007 & 2017
2007
2017
Borough/
Percentage of
Percentage of Percentage of
Percentage of
Category
Screened
Screened
Screened
Screened
SchoolPrograms
Programs that Programs that
Programs that
that Had NO
Maintained a
Had NO
Maintained a
Geographic
Geographic
Geographic
Geographic
Priority for
Priority for
Priority for
Priority for
Admission
Admission
Admission
Admission
(“Open to All
(District,
(“Open to All
(District,
NYC”)
Borough or
NYC”)
Borough or
otherwise)
otherwise)
Bronx
32%
64%
76%
24%
Brooklyn
57%
42%
57%
43%
Manhattan
64%
33%
60%
40%
Queens
47%
53%
49%
51%
Staten
81%
19%
85%
15%
Island
TOTAL
55%
45%
60%
40%

Less Selective
Screened
School
Programs

More
Selective
Screened
School
Programs

Table 4.8. Selectivity & Geographic Priority, 2007 & 2017
Median Selectivity for the Year
Number of Programs with Selectivity At or
Less Than Median Chance of Getting into
the Program
Number that Have a Geographic Priority
Number that Have NO Geographic Priority
Number of Programs with Selectivity
Greater Than Median Chance of Getting
into the Program
Number that Have a Geographic Priority
Number that Have NO Geographic Priority

2007
13%
84

2017
10%
85

51
33
78

56
29
75

38
40

40
35

The Impact of Admissions Requirements/Tasks, Geography & Selectivity On Labor
Pascarella and Terenzini (2005) assert that admissions requirements are also
measures of institutional quality that impact the way students apply to colleges and
therefore impact their overall selectivity. To test this idea in screened school-programs, I
looked at the types of admissions requirements or tasks students were asked to complete.
53

Based on the Directory dataset in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, I identify the most frequently used
admissions requirements and I present those requirements against the use of a geographic
priority for both 2007 and 2017. Finally, in Table 4.11, I identify the most labor-intensive
admissions requirements, as they were established by participant interviews, against the
median percent-selectivity for each year. From these tables, I conclude that there is a
relationship between using particularly labor-intensive admissions requirements,
geographic priority, and selectivity, where the most selective screened school-programs
use the most labor-intensive admissions requirements in conjunction with a geographic
priority to increase their selectivity.
Table 4.9 shows that in 2007, screened school-programs that had no geographic
priority were more likely to use multiple admissions tasks to assess candidates. Although
only 77% of screened programs in general, used attendance and/or punctuality to
determine eligibility, that percentage increased when a program had no geographic
priority; 85% of programs with no geographic priority used attendance and/or punctuality
as their number one screen in 2007 and an additional 15% used this requirement as a
subsequent indicator of student eligibility; meaning 100% of the screened schoolprograms with no geographic priority, used attendance and/or punctuality as an
admissions requirement.
Table 4.10 shows that in 2017, programs that had no geographic priority were less
likely to use multiple admissions tasks to assess candidates. Although only 91% of
screened programs in general, used attendance and/or punctuality to determine eligibility,
that percentage increased when a program had no geographic priority; 95% of programs
with no geographic priority used attendance and/or punctuality as their number one
screen in 2017. Using attendance & punctuality to evaluate applicants has been cited as a
controversial requirement (Perez, 2011), but as Daenerys stated in her interview that in
the absence of a geographic priority, attendance and punctuality could be used as an
initial filter for applicants that can be “easily sorted in excel” and further rationalizing
this controversial requirement by stating that “it matters because if you’re not here, we
can’t teach you.” Again, this demonstrates the competing professional identities that
personnel are forced to reconcile when public education undergoes marketization.
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Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show that in both 2007 and 2017, other popular requirements
for screened school-programs with no geographic priority were demonstrated interest (a
visit to the school or expressed written contact), an interview or a writing sample, all of
which were rated as being among the most labor-intensive admissions tasks for high
school-program personnel to implement by my interviewees. To further illuminate, I
provide Table 4.11, which shows that all screened school-programs saw an increase in
the use of additional tasks to evaluate applicants, tasks that all require the support of
personnel at the high school level. In 2007, 41 or 24.5% of screened school-programs
engaged in applicant evaluation tasks that required additional work from the high school
level. In 2017, that number rose to 59 or 37% of screened school-programs that engaged
in some sort of additional applicant evaluation tasks. The use of additional applicant tasks
rose most significantly from 2007 to 2017 in the most selective programs, whereas the
less selective screened programs only increased their use of these tools by one or two
school-programs between 2007 and 2017. The labor involved in these kinds of
admissions requirements is further discussed in Chapter 5.
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Table 4.9. 2007 Admissions Requirements & Geographic Priority, by percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
of Screened
of Screened
of Screened
of Screened
Programs
Programs
Programs
Programs
Admissions
that Use this that Use this that Use this that Use this
Requirement/Task Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
as their
as their
as a
as a
Number 1
Number 1
Subsequent
Subsequent
Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
(n= 167)
and have NO
(n=167)
and have NO
geographic
geographic
priority
priority
(n=75)
(n=75)
Attendance and/or
77%
85%
18%
15%
Punctuality
Demonstrated
14%
9%
.5%
1%
Interest (school
visit or written
contact)
Interview (general)
6%
5%
3%
3%
Writing Sample
--16%
11%
(general)
School-based test
.5%
-1%
1%
taken on-site
Online Admissions
--.5%
1%
Activity
Student Portfolio
--2%
1%
Special to the
--.5%
-School
3 or More
10%
12%
Required Tasks
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Table 4.10. 2017 Admissions Requirements & Geographic Priority, by percentage
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
Screened
Screened
Screened
Screened
Programs
Programs
Programs
Programs
Admissions
that Use this
that Use this
that Use this
that Use this
Requirement/Task Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
as their
as their
as a
as a
Number 1
Number 1
Subsequent
Subsequent
Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
(n=161)
and have NO
(n=161)
and have NO
geographic
geographic
priority
priority
(n=65)
(n=65)
Attendance and/or
Punctuality
Demonstrated
Interest (school
visit or written
contact)
Interview (general)
Writing Sample
(general)
Math Sample
(general)
School-based test
taken on-site
Online Admissions
Activity
Student Portfolio
Special to the
School
Foreign Language
Course Grade
No Requirements
Beyond Grades and
State Exam Scores
3 or More Required
Tasks

91%

95%

2%

0

2%

0

16%

15%

1%
--

1.5%
--

19%
14%

12%
11%

--

--

3%

3%

--

--

1%

0

--

--

1%

3%

-2%

---

2%
10%

1.5%
8%

1%

--

--

--

2%

3%

--

--

51%

12%
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Less Selective
Screened SchoolPrograms

More Selective
Screened SchoolPrograms

Table 4.11. Selectivity & Use of Labor Intensive Admissions Tasks, 2007 & 2017
Median Selectivity for the Year
2007
2017
13%
10%
Number of Programs with Selectivity At or Less
84
85
Than Median Chance of Getting into the Program
Number of programs that required either
9
16
demonstrated interest, an interview or a student
work sample (math or writing)
Number of programs that required a combination of
12
20
demonstrated interest, an interview and/or a student
work sample (math or writing)
Number of Programs with Selectivity Greater Than
78
75
Median Chance of Getting into the Program
Number of programs that required either
14
15
demonstrated interest, an interview or a student
work sample (math or writing)
Number of programs that required a combination of
6
8
demonstrated interest, an interview and/or a student
work sample (math or writing)
Total Number of Screened High School-Programs Requiring
41
59
Additional Steps by Personnel, in order to Evaluate
Applicants
Selectivity & Formal Accountability Measures
Saunder and Espeland (2009) argued that in the process of becoming marketized,
standardized accountability measures often had a substantial impact on the selectivity and
subsequent ranking of law school programs by major media outlets. This finding
complements that of Pascarella and Terenzini (2005), who argue that any published
measures of a college program has an impact on perceived institutional quality and
therefore the number of students who apply and thus the college’s percent selectivity, as
well as Hoxby (2009) who demonstrated that a history of selectivity yielded positive
benefits for colleges. For Saunder and Espeland, the publicized rankings had a
measureable impact on the work of personnel in the law school, whose jobs revolved
around any of the elements that were used to rank the law school, creating both anxiety
and allure in their individual work. To test whether these concepts were at work in
screened high school-programs in New York City and what, if any questions I might ask
in interviews, I used my Directory dataset to create Table 4.12, which shows the median
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scores on formal accountability measures for the most selective screened schoolprograms and the least selective screened school-programs in both 2007 & 2017.
Table 4.12 indicates that the selectivity of a screened school-program may have
an impact on formal accountability measures. In each year, the more selective schoolprograms had a higher median recent Progress Report; in 2007, the more selective
school-programs also had a higher recent Quality Review score, although in 2017, this
score was equal between the most selective and least selective school-programs. The
number of programs in this particular table do not equal the exact number of screened
school-programs for each year because in 2007, there were five new screened schoolprograms opening and in 2017 there was one new school-program opening, none of
which had data to offer on selectivity nor accountability measures, since they were only
then beginning to accept students.
From this table, I conclude the findings of Saunder and Espeland, Pascarella and
Terenzini and Hoxby in the following ways. As Saunder and Espeland and Pascarella and
Terenzini revealed, table 4.12 shows that there is a positive relationship between
selectivity and accountability measures which impact perceived institutional quality; I
cannot conclude whether that relationship is causal due to limitations in my dataset
described in Chapter 3. I also conclude some support for Hoxby’s findings that the longer
a school-program is highly selective, the greater its chances of maintaining that
selectivity, and being rewarded for their selectivity by higher scores on accountability
measures. From these descriptive statistics, and establishing that selectivity may have a
positive impact on accountability measures over time, I was able to develop interview
questions that followed those of Saunder and Espeland (2009) and Espeland and Saunder
(2007), who interviewed law school personnel whose jobs were closely linked to
measures that impacted their ranking.
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Less Selective
Screened
School
Programs

More Selective
Screened School
Programs

Table 4.12. Selectivity, Formal Accountability Measures 2007 & 2017
Median Selectivity for the Year
2007
13%
Number of Programs with Selectivity At or
84
Less Than Median Chance of Getting into the
Program
Median Recent Progress Report Score
B
Median Recent Quality Review Score
WellDeveloped
Number of Programs with Selectivity Greater
78
Than Median Chance of Getting into the
Program
Median Recent Progress Report Score
C
Median Recent Quality Review Score
Proficient

2017
10%
85
A
Proficient
75
B
Proficient

Selectivity & Selection Criteria
Another element of Pascarella and Terenzini’s findings on perceived institutional
quality and selectivity was that the average accepted student grades and SAT scores had
an impact on perceived institutional quality and selectivity; they also show that increased
average entry grades and SAT scores had a measureable impact on career and salary
gains for college graduates. This again, works in tandem with Hoxby’s idea that the
longer a school maintains high selectivity, the greater its benefits are over time. To test
this idea in screened school-programs, I used my Directory dataset to create Table 4.13.
This table presents the median course grades of accepted students in English and Math, as
well as the median scores on the state English Language Arts (ELA) and Math exams;
these grades and scores are divided by the most selective school-programs and the least
selective school-programs for both 2007 and 2017.
The 2007 grade and exam score requirements for entry into all screened schoolprograms, regardless of selectivity, were higher than in 2017. Although the median
grades and scores lowered from 2007 to 2017, there are a few key ideas to keep in mind.
First, 2007 was among the first years the admissions process was implemented in its
current form, and second, the most selective screened school-programs lowered their
grade and exam score requirements from 2007 to 2017, but not nearly as much as the
least selective screened school-programs did. By showing that indeed, the more selective
screened school-programs maintained higher applicant grades and exam scores, I can
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conclude Pascarella and Terenzini’s findings that these elements have a positive impact
on perceived institutional quality and selectivity.
Looking back at Table 4.12, the findings from Table 4.13 allow me to further
conclude Hoxby’s findings. Comparing both tables, it is clear that programs that were
more selective in 2007 benefitted from attracting higher performing students because
these same programs earned a median score of “A” on their most recent Progress Report
and a recent Quality Review score of “Well-Developed,” as opposed to their less
selective screened peers who earned a median score of “C “on their most recent Progress
Report and a recent Quality Review score of “Proficient.” Those scores may have
attracted lower scoring applicants in subsequent years, whereas the more selective
schools, whose median recent accountability measures did decrease in 2017, had the
benefit of years of stronger students to continue requiring stronger applicants. These
findings are further supported by findings from the interviews with more established
screened school-programs, who specifically discussed the need to scale back and lessen
their presence in the high school market place, because their reputations had become
amplified over the last ten years.

Less Selective
Screened SchoolPrograms

More Selective
Screened SchoolPrograms

Table 4.13. Selectivity & Admissions Criteria for Course Grades and State Exam Scores,
2007 & 2017
Median Selectivity for the Year
2007
2017
13%
10%
Number of Programs with Selectivity At or Less
84
85
Than Median Chance of Getting into the Program
Median course grade required for English
80-100
70-100
Median course grade required for Math
80-100
80-100
Median State Exam score required for English
3.0-4.0
2.0-4.0
Language Arts
Median State Exam score required for Math
3.0-4.0
2.0-4.0
Number of Programs with Selectivity Greater Than
Median Chance of Getting into the Program
Median course grade required for English
Median course grade required for Math
Median State Exam score required for English
Language Arts
Median State Exam score required for Math
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78

75

70-100
70-100
3.0-4.0

60-100
60-100
1.0-4.0

3.0-4.0

1.0-4.0

Selectivity & Maintenance of a Website
As mentioned in Part I of this chapter, the process of marketization leads to a
belief that continued investment in oneself will yield greater outcomes in nearly all
measures of economic life (Fraser, 2009; Peters & Besley, 2007). In that section, I
discussed the increase in the number of screened school-programs that host a website
outside of the DOE provided School Portal page and concluded that this was an example
of screened school-programs developing an enterprising-self in the face of increasing
marketization. My next step was to demonstrate that not only were screened schoolprograms developing an enterprising-self, but that it was indeed having a positive impact
on their admissions process.
In Table 4.14 I present the number of screened school-programs that are above
and below the median percent selectivity, against the number that are operating websites
outside of the DOE provided School Portal page, for both 2007 and 2017. The overall
percentage of screened school-programs operating a website outside of the DOE provided
School Portal, increased significantly from 2007 to 2017- from 50% of screened schoolprograms in 2007 to 83% of screened school-programs in 2017. This is not surprising
given the time period, but both the most and least selective screened school-programs
increased their use of outside websites at about the same rate. Even still, the most
selective screened school-programs were more likely to operate a website separate from
the DOE School Portal, than their less selective peers in both 2007 and 2017.
As I stated in Part I’s discussion on websites, this conclusion is significant
because operating a website requires budgeting. Each website includes, at minimum, the
cost of maintaining a domain, a person to create the website to begin with and a person to
regularly update information on the program. Per my interviews with administrators at
case study school-programs, this is a cost that is not accounted for in school budgets,
making it a cost that requires principals to navigate their fiscal responsibilities gingerly.
In two out of the three school-programs that served as case studies, participants discussed
the importance of having a website for ensuring “a clean, professional look” (Lulu) as a
way to dispel negative myths about their school-program or to easily “disseminate
information and reduce clerical tasks like answering questions over the phone” (Junot).
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One element that may be misleading about these numbers is that 74% of screened schoolprograms are programs within a larger high school. This may skew the total count of
school-programs in favor of having a website, which in their case is a cost spread out
over several programs within a school rather than coming out of the budget of one single
program.
Table 4.14. Selectivity & Website, 2007 & 2017
Median Selectivity for the Year

Less
Selective
Screened
SchoolPrograms

More
Selective
Screened
SchoolPrograms

Number of Programs with Selectivity At or Less
Than Median Chance of Getting into the Program
Number of programs that operate a website outside
of the DOE provided School Portal
Number of Programs with Selectivity Greater Than
Median Chance of Getting into the Program
Number of programs that operate a website outside
of the DOE provided School Portal
Total Number/Percent of Screened School-Programs operating a
website outside of the DOE provided School Portal

2007
13%
84

2017
10%
85

47

71

78

75

36
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83
50%

134
83%

From the findings of this dataset, I conclude that screened school-programs are
experiencing the phenomenon of marketization and developing an enterprising-self, as it
was described by Fraser (2009) and Peters and Besley (2007). I also conclude that, like
colleges that stand to gain or lose because of their selectivity and its cascading
implications, screened high school-programs in New York City face similar, sometimes
mirror, challenges connected with selectivity and perceived institutional quality
(Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005; Hoxby, 2009). Because selectivity is uniquely connected
to the admissions process, I also conclude that as Saunder and Espeland found with law
school personnel, the personnel working screened high school-programs face similar
challenges to their workload that are related to the admissions process and its impact on
selectivity (Lundstrom & Holm, 2011). To further examine this redefined workload and
the stressors involved in implementing the admissions process, I used the findings from
this chapter to support the creation of interview questions and to select three screened
school-program communities to study, with the experiences of ten personnel across the
three screened school-programs.
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Chapter Summary
Chapter 4 draws from the Directory dataset and concludes that screened high
school-programs in New York City are indeed experiencing the phenomenon of
marketization, and that they experience much of challenges presented by selectivity that
colleges face. The challenges of keeping up with selectivity are also contextualized using
quotes and information from interview participants and show how personnel navigate the
complexity of their professional identities around the admissions process. In Part I of this
chapter I use three examples from the Directory dataset to show that screened high
school-programs are developing an enterprising-self and engaged in the process of
becoming marketized. From that conclusion, in Part II, I establish the increasing
selectivity of screened high school-programs, and Part III examines several ways that
selectivity impacts, or is impacted by, other admissions processes and requirements.
These include the increased use of a geographic priority or attendance and/or punctuality
as admissions requirements for the most selective screened-school programs; that
screened school-programs with no geographic priority have increased their use of more
labor intensive admissions tasks; selectivity has a slightly positive relationship with
performance on accountability measures, the academic performance of applicants, and
the use of a separate website. The findings of this chapter guided the interview questions
and participant selection that generated the data presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE DATA FINDINGS
Qualitative Data Findings Overview
The descriptive statistics in Chapter 4 provide the foundational conclusion that
indeed, screened school-programs possess the factors of marketization, as they were
described in the literature. From those findings, I also concluded that screened schoolprograms have been thrust into the process of developing an enterprising-self because of
the imposition of the admissions process and their status as “screened” school-programs
within that process. These findings also established an increase in labor-intensive
admissions tasks that increased the workload and, at times, challenged the professional
identities of those engaged in admissions at screened school-program. These conclusions
allowed me to move onto the next phase of data collection. Part II of my data collection
examined, on both the individual level and on the school-program-community level, how
the reality of marketization and developing an enterprising-self, has redefined the work of
school-program personnel. Unlike Chapter 4, which was focused on reviewing the
Directory dataset according to the literature, this chapter focuses on the individual and
school-program community’s interpretation, internalization, normalization of and
resistance to the admissions process. In examining the interview data this way, I show
how much of the admissions process is dependent on the individuals involved, some of
the impacts of this process on the overall school-program community, and the shifts in
daily work and professional culture around the admissions process that challenge the
traditional professional identities for those working in public education (Lundstrom
Holm, 2011).
This chapter demonstrates the power of leadership in shaping the interpretation,
internalization and normalization of the admissions process, as well as any resistance to
the process and its competition. Further, I conclude that the reputation of the schoolprogram and the extent to which its admissions process is collaborative, have an impact
on interpretation, internalization and normalization as well. At the end of this chapter I
discuss unanticipated findings that emerged from these interviews, but present new
unique questions of the implementation of the admissions process: how to compensate
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workers, the role of professional women in this process, the role of institutional history
and knowledge in this process and more.
Table 3.1 at the end of Chapter 3 provides descriptions of the interview
participants and below, in Table 5.1, I provide descriptive statistics from the Directory
dataset on each school-program to contextualize the screened school-programs where
interview participants work(ed). The factors listed in Table 5.1 are related to the process
of marketization and developing an enterprising-self; this also displays the factors that
link the process of marketization to the intensification of work, work related to marketing
and the development of competing professional identities as a result of this work
(Cucchiara, Gold & Simon, 2011; Lundstrom & Holm, 2011; Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe,
1995).
The findings of the interviews are organized first by coding categories:
implementation of the admissions process, interpretation of the process and competition,
internalization and normalization of the process and competition, resistance to the process
and competition, and changes in daily work, professional or school-program culture
around the admissions process. Second, I provide school-program examples of each
coding category: the Established Individualist school-program, the Quiet Secret schoolprogram and the Passionate Underdog school-program; this examines individual
expressions of the coding category as well as similarities and differences within and
between school-programs. Third, I examine overall patterns that emerged from the
interviews that demonstrate the process of marketization, the development of
enterprising-self and challenges to professional identities that were not necessarily
captured by the coding categories.
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Table 5.1 School-Program Descriptive Statistics, Rounded Where Possible to Protect
Anonymity
School Program /
Established
Quiet
Passionate
Categories
Individualist
Secret
Underdog
Student Enrollment
Under 500
Under 500
Under 1000
Percent Selectivity, 2007
1%
4%
40%
Percent Selectivity, 2017
5%
2%
30%
Maintained a Website,
No
No
No
2007
Maintained a Website,
Yes
Yes
Yes
2017
Allowed Visits, 2007
Unknown
Yes
Unknown
Allowed Visits, 2017
Yes
Yes
Yes
Progress Report, 2007
B
A
F
Most Recent Progress
A
A
Unknown
Report, 2017
Quality Review, 2007
Well-Developed
Proficient
Well-Developed
Most Recent Quality
Proficient
Well-Developed
Proficient
Review, 2017
Core Course Grades
None Listed
80-100
80-100
Used to Determine
Admission, 2007
Core Course Grades
Will review but no
80-100
80-100
Used to Determine
preference listed
Admission, 2017
ELA State Test Scores
None Listed
2.0-4.0
2.0-4.0
Used to Determine
Admission, 2007
ELA State Test Scores
Will review but no
3.0-4.0
Will review but
Used to Determine
preference listed
no preference
Admission, 2017
listed
Math State Test Scores
None Listed
2.0-4.0
2.0-4.0
Used to Determine
Admission, 2007
Math State Test Scores
Will review but no
3.0-4.0
Will review but
Used to Determine
preference listed
no preference
Admission, 2017
listed
• Writing Sample
• Attendance &
• Attendance &
Types of Admissions
Punctuality
Punctuality
• Visit to School
Tasks Listed, 2007

Types of Admissions
Tasks Listed, 2017

• Interview

• Writing Sample

• Visit to School
• Writing Sample

• Writing Sample
• Visit to School
• Interview

• Attendance &
Punctuality
• Writing Sample

• Attendance &
Punctuality
• Visit to School
• Writing Sample
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I. Implementation of the Process
In coding interview data for “implementation of the admissions process,” I sought
to be able to richly describe each school-program’s admissions process—not just the
version of the process that is published for applicant use, but rather the admissions
process that happens once an applicant has submitted their materials or met the required
tasks for admission. My focus, again, is on the labor performed at the high schoolprogram level by personnel tasked with implementing the admissions process. In Tables
5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, I provide an overview of the admissions process at each school-program
by using the information provided to me from all participants at that school-program.
Established Individualist’s Admissions Process
From interviews with Isabel, Mango and Peaches from the Established
Individualist school-program, Table 5.2 describes the process that is in place to admit
eligible students.
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Table 5.2 Established Individualist’s Admissions Process
SPRING/
SUMMER

FALL

WINTER

LATE
WINTER/
SPRING

SPRING

Reflection: Looking Back and Looking Ahead
Director of Admissions meets with admissions committee to reflect on the year’s
process and make changes deemed necessary for the year ahead; meetings with
administrative team to determine any new Central DOE requirements that will
necessitate changes to the current process; updating public-facing venues that
communicate admissions process to potential applicants; administration may also
evaluate over-the-counter students* and admit them to incoming class.
Admissions Events
Three Open House events are held in the afternoons to provide information about the
school and admissions process—coordinated by the Director of Admissions; includes
teachers and student volunteers to discuss the curriculum and their experience,
respectively; attendance at each open house is capped at 900 attendees. Administration
attends city-hosted events to represent the school.
Receiving Application Packages
Director of Admissions opens all application packages, sorts application materials, logs
application materials into a database; Administrative team fields communication from
VIPs and professional colleagues seeking admission for a specific student.
Review of Application Materials
Director of Admissions assigns materials to review to each member of the admissions
committee (8-9 volunteers), including reading a student writing sample and ranking it
against a rubric; this includes 800-1,000 applicant writing samples; admissions
committee meets to narrow down the pool of applicants for interview process to less
than 300 applicants
Interviews
Director of Admissions invites eligible applicants to interview; assigns interview slots
to each member of the admissions team; each interview lasts one hour, includes a tour
of the school to active classrooms, a conversation with the student, another writing
sample and a conversation with parents. Administrative team and Director of
Admissions field communications from students and families who did not make it to the
interview round
Narrowing the Pool of Applicants
Admissions committee meets to discuss and narrow the pool of applicants down to the
incoming class; 3-4 hours a day for 1-2 weeks of meetings; admissions committee
presents final group to Principal to make the final selections—provides the principal
with all rubrics, notes and rationale for each student.
Matching
Students who are selected to be part of the incoming class are notified per city-wide
system.
Orientation
Admissions team and whole school community host an orientation that includes
teacher-speakers, students, and team-building activities for incoming class.

*Over-the-counter students are those students who are entering the New York City public school system for the first
time or after a period of being away from New York City public schools. These students are not able to participate in
the regular admissions process because they were not part of New York City schools when the process would have
taken place. These students are sent to individual school-programs by the borough or city-wide enrollment office, and
the school-program evaluates them for admission, which is often an on-the-spot process that results in an offer or a
rejection. All school-programs, screened and otherwise, deal with this phenomenon, as it is part of the regular ebb and
flow of students in and out of New York City and the public school system.
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Quiet Secret’s Admissions Process
From interviews with Angelica, Daenerys, Jane, and John from the Quiet Secret
school-program, Table 5.3 describes the process that is in place to admit eligible students.
It should be noted that Table 3.1 shows that Jane and John are both former members of
the personnel at Quiet Secret; that fact has implications for the information in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3 The Quiet Secret’s Admissions Process
SUMMER

FALL

Preparation
Admissions Coordinator stores away previous year’s application materials in case of audit;
makes new application cover sheets relevant for the new school year and that comply with
any new Central DOE requirements that will necessitate changes to the current process;
communicates with website manager to update public-facing venues that communicate
admissions process to potential applicants; select dates and create online sign up for Open
House event. Administration may also evaluate over-the-counter students* and admit them
to incoming class.
Admissions Events
Two Versions of this process were recounted to me.
Version 1 (from former personnel): School-program hosts tours during the school day up to
four days a week during the Fall; these include approximately 20 families per tour and
include a tour of the school in up to three active classrooms; and an information session on
the admissions requirements and Q &A with students and a teacher.
Version 2 (from current personnel): Two Open House events are held on a day when
school is closed; coordinated by the Admissions Coordinator—events provide information
about the school, the admissions process; includes guidance team, administrators and
student volunteers; attendance at each open house is capped at approximately 1,000
attendees.

WINTER

All Agree:
The Special Education team and guidance staff host a special Open House event just for
special education applicants; an administrator, teacher and guidance counselor attend cityhosted events to represent the school at city-wide and borough fairs; Admissions
Coordinator attends several meetings with Central DOE to ensure that process is happening
as its supposed to and develop understanding of new admissions-related compliance
requirements that will be enacted in the following school year.
Receiving Application Packages
Admissions Coordinator opens all application packages, sorts application materials, logs
application materials into a database; Admissions Coordinator completes initial screening
of applicants materials and follows up with middle school personnel regarding incomplete
application packages and issues of attendance. School-program receives close to 1,200
application packages.
Review of Application Materials
Two Versions of this process were recounted to me.
Version 1 (from former personnel): All school-program personnel are invited to engage in
ranking student writing samples and other application materials against a rubric and sorting
students into levels of acceptance; each writing sample must be read by two readers with a
third for those who warrant large discrepancies or were evaluated by personnel who
couldn’t be counted on to evaluate fairly.

SPRING

Version 2 (from current personnel): Administrator, with the help of Senior student
volunteers, reviews all application packages a second time after the Admissions
Coordinator completes initial screening; administrator ranks applicants in city-wide
computer system.
Matching
Students who are selected to be part of the incoming class are notified per city-wide
system.
Orientation
Admissions team, Freshman teachers, guidance staff and student volunteers host an
orientation for incoming Freshman class that includes completion of paperwork, a
placement test, purchasing of school-logo gear, and opportunity to walk around the school.
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Passionate Underdog’s Admissions Process
From interviews with Chip, Junot and Lulu from the Passionate Underdog schoolprogram, Table 5.4 describes the process that is in place to admit eligible students.
Table 5.4 The Passionate Underdog’s Admissions Process
SPRING/
SUMMER

FALL

LATE
FALL/
WINTER

WINTER

SPRING

Preparation
Administrator stores away previous year’s application materials in case of audit; ensures
that admissions process will comply with any new Central DOE requirements that will
necessitate changes to the previous process; communicates with other administrator about
website and brochures to update public-facing venues that communicate admissions
process to potential applicants; select dates for Open House events and other visits;
publish those. Administration may also evaluate over-the-counter students* and admit
them to incoming class.
Admissions Events
Four Open House events are held in the afternoons coordinated by administration-- events
provide information about the school, the admissions process and collection of a student
writing sample; includes at least four teachers, at least one administrator and student
volunteers. At least one administrator, one teacher and a few students attend city-hosted
events to represent the school at city-wide and borough fairs. Administrator who
coordinates admissions attends several meetings with Central DOE to ensure that process
is happening as it’s supposed to and develop understanding of new admissions-related
compliance requirements that will be enacted in the following school year.
Review of Application Materials
Administrator gives all writing samples collected at Open Houses to a teacher who
evaluates them against the writing sample portion of the overall rubric; Administrator then
rates each applicant against the overall rubric using both the writing sample and schooldata provided on the city-wide application system; this rating goes into an Excel
spreadsheet. Only students who attend an Open House provide a writing sample.**
Ranking
Administrator sorts applicants in Excel by score on the rubric and then enters ranking onto
city-wide admissions system.
Matching
Students who are selected to be part of the incoming class are notified per city-wide
system.
Orientation
Administration, teachers, guidance staff and student volunteers host an orientation for
incoming Freshman class that includes completion of paperwork, school tour and teambuilding exercises.

**Number of attendees at Open Houses was not revealed, but several times Lulu, the administrator who
coordinates admissions, used the phrase “we don’t get enough kids,” to describe the dearth of applicants the
school battles with. Since only students who attend an Open House provide a writing sample, it appears that
there may only be small numbers of writing samples to rate.

Implementation of the admissions process at all three school-programs shows how
each school-program must simultaneously navigate homogenization by a system eager to
make the process simple for applicants, while also demonstrating their difference through
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these standardized procedures (Saunder & Espeland, 2009). All three school-programs
host admissions related events, and all three identify these as “Open Houses,” that occur
between two and four times in the fall; all three school-programs use the summer to do
some measure of tweaking to their system; all three school-programs undergo a process
of reviewing student application materials against a rubric; all three school-programs
contend with the summer-time movement of accepted students around the system by
dealing with over-the-counter students; all three programs must use the city-wide
admissions computer system to cull information about students and to enter their final
rankings of students.
Despite the similarities in their implementation of the process, there are many
differences in the ways each school-program enacts the process. For example, while all
three school-programs use the summer to tweak their admissions process, only
Established Individualist hosts a specific meeting with the admissions team to reflect on
the previous year’s process; Isabel cited that they use the meeting to “look forward and
look back, look over the questions that we ask in the interview process and having done it
for a whole season, we all talk about, like, ‘what doesn't feel right, what do we want to
change, take out, adjust the wording?’ We're really very particular about every step,
trying to make it comfortable for the child and trying to make it clear for us to get the
information that we really want.” This demonstrates a level of reflection on the process
that was not evidenced in the other two school-programs. This may be interpreted as
resistance to the imposed homogenization of the process and strategic use of the lack of
regulation for the parts of the process that are conducted solely at the individual schoolprogram, beyond the surveillance of Central DOE staff, as was demonstrated by Espeland
and Saunder’s concept of ‘reactivity’ in implementing a highly surveilled process (2007).
As Levaçic (1995), noted in her concept of marketization that separates purchaser
and provider, the implementation of each school’s process also shows that each is
involved to greater and lesser degrees with the Central Department of Education. This is
seen in both the Quiet Secret and Passionate Underdog’s processes which include regular
communication with the Central Department of Education about their process and
upcoming processes. Being tasked with coordinating the admissions process at their
respective school-programs, Angelica and Lulu both expressed their insistence on staying
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in contact with Central DOE citing that relationship building with members of the Office
of Enrollment made it possible for them to access greater information about applicants
and troubleshoot issues in a process that both women described as “stressful.” This is in
contrast to Established Individualist’s approach where admissions committee member,
Mango, told me “I don’t know if I should say this out loud…. Um. We try not to think
about the DOE at all,” a sentiment that was echoed by other Established Individualist
participants as well.
The number of people involved in conducting each of these individual processes
within the larger process varies from school-program to school-program, but again the
Established Individualist school-program seems to stand apart. Both Passionate Underdog
and Quiet Secret employ many personnel and students at large scale events like Open
Houses and Orientations, but the vast majority of their work is conducted by a small
group of personnel—one overall coordinator and someone to rate writing samples,
sometimes an additional person to participate in one of those activities; all of those
involved are members of the school-program’s staff. Again, in contrast is Established
Individualist, which uses a coordinator and an admissions committee of eight to nine
volunteers, the administrative team and, in some years, one or two teachers who “have a
lighter teaching load” as was recalled by all three participants from the school-program.
By this measure, Established Individualist has fully internalized and normalized the
importance of the admissions process. As Harvey and Fraser explain, in the neoliberal
economy the individual, or in this case the school-program, takes on all the personal
accountability for developing their capital, in place of the governments responsibility for
social welfare (Harvey, 2011; Fraser, 2009).
II. Interpretation of the Process and/or Competition
The coding category “Interpretation of the Admissions Process and/or
Competition,” for interview data was derived from the categories for discussing
marketization provided by Saunder and Espeland (2009). This category analyzes the way
each participant and each school-program community generally interprets the process and
the competition affiliated with the process: do they regard the process and competition as
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positive? Negative? Empowering? Exhausting? What kinds of words and phases did
participants use to describe their experience of the process, the competition it engenders,
and its impact on their work life?
Established Individualist’s Interpretation of the Admissions Process and Competition
The Established Individualist’s general interpretation of the admissions process is
that at the school-program level the process is quite collaborative and something to feel
proud of, but there is definitely a sense of secrecy about their process. Their general
interpretation of competition is that it is a distraction that deserves little to no attention.
Peaches, Mango and Isabel all discussed the process with enthusiasm and all three stated
the importance of the screened status and how grateful they are that they get to choose
their students, “the screened status is great because we get to engage in this wonderful
process of meeting terrific kids who want to be with us, who want to sit in our
classrooms, and we get the privilege of getting to know them,” Mango asserts.
The collaborative nature of the process and the camaraderie amongst the
admissions committee members was clearly described by Isabel and Mango in recounting
the tone and discussions had during the selection of applicants for interviews and then for
the final class. Both members expressed a sense of secrecy about the process due to the
school’s well-established reputation; Mango stated that “they try to keep [the process]
kind of separate because it opens up a lot of questions like ‘can you do this for us?” At
first I was unclear on what that meant until interviews with Peaches and Isabel revealed
more. Isabel stated that they do not really try to promote the school due to the high
number of applicants and went on to say that the process and who is involved is “all very
secret…we don't announce it, it's not written down anywhere,” because by the late fall
the administration gets “bombarded with emails and phone calls from people who know
someone, who knows someone, and we get a lot of people asking for favors.” This was
confirmed by administrator, Peaches, “I get probably, anywhere from 50 to 100
solicitations from people who know people, or people who just want their kids to be
given priority, and that includes people such as my superintendent, the chancellor, yes.”
For those engaged in the admissions process at Established Individualist, the process,
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which is can be described as positive and collaborative, is also mired in the challenges of
being a highly regarded school-program that has many potential applicants.
The process was also interpreted as time-consuming, but worth it, due to the
added pressures associated with interviewing and touring students: “we’re spending an
hour, an hour, with these kids, one-on-one—that’s more than some private schools do!”
mused Peaches. “I’m so glad my kids are older now, because admissions season is hectic!
It really requires a lot of my time, because you have to really be thoughtful and listen to
the students,” Mango described. Director of Admissions, Isabel, who described in
Chapter 4 the laborious nature of opening application materials, also stated how
consuming the process is, as she is in constant communication with the administrative
team and admissions committee members about their progress; as we’ll see with all three
school-programs the mantra of each person who coordinates admissions is something
along the lines of “just get it done.”
When asked about their sense of the competitive school-program marketplace,
participants were able to identify competition, but often resisted doing so. All three stated
that they had never really thought too much about it and required a moment of pause to
consider the question; for all three their answers ended with some iteration of, “but I
don’t really know,” a way to brush off and move to the next question. Only Peaches
challenged the notion by identifying the fact that Established Individualist is part of
several competitive markets within the school choice setting and all of them place
Established Individualist towards the top of the heap.
Quiet Secret’s Interpretation of the Admissions Process and Competition
Quiet Secret’s interpretation of the admissions process deeply depended on the
testimony from former personnel and current personnel. In general, the former personnel,
Jane and John, viewed the process as collaborative, as an all-hands-on-deck experience
and as one that allowed the professional community to constantly engage in
conversations about the school-program’s mission and vision. John spoke of “full staff
discussions” on the process, describing how if a personnel member was asked to do
something admissions-related “the answer would usually be ‘yes,’ and that was because
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we knew that it needed to happen,” and that he “felt very, very invested in being a part of
the process of making sure that we matched with students who would benefit from our
school community.” Similarly, Jane recalled the camaraderie of teachers rating writing
samples together who would “sit and read [writing samples] for a couple of hours and
then go and get something to eat, and those were lovely things to see, because it's a high,
high pressure time with the complete other layer going on, of the regular work.” Both
talked about the dignity of supporting students who were brave enough to put themselves
out there for evaluation, by actually reading their application materials and the
importance of such an act.
The current personnel, Daenerys and Angelica, generally viewed the process on
an individual level and as somewhat isolating, citing that part of their reasons for wanting
to participate in the study was the fact that they love talking about the admissions process
but never have anyone else to talk to about it, “I don’t ever really get to talk about it. Its
an isolated thing, like, I do it alone, and I’ve been doing it alone,” recounted Daenerys.
Both participants discussed the late nights, weekend and holiday work that are required to
“just get it done.” However, they both also shared the sentiment that they knew no one
else would do it or it would be done poorly without their work. Again this shows a sense
of internalized personal responsibility that is so clearly expressed in the definition of a
worker in the neoliberal economy.
Despite their differences, all four participants from Quiet Secret did share
similarities in their interpretation of the process regardless of status as current or former
personnel: the importance of the process and the competition embedded in the process.
Like the participants from Established Individualist, all four participants described the
importance of the work as John did above, and going further to state that the work is
“important to me” and “an opportunity to allow all applicants to have a voice.” In all four
of the interviews, it was clear that the school-program community fosters a commitment
to a fair process that honored applicants, because “you’re changing someone’s life. And
at the same time, I’m also saying no to somebody, so I try not to get all in my head about
it ‘cause then I would accept everyone and we can’t accept everyone.”
Another similarity between participant’s interpretation of the process was the ease
with which all four could identify their school-program’s competition: those who they
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were competing with for students and those who they were certainly beating in the quasimarket of screened high school-programs. All four described the school-program as a
kind of “safety-school” for those seeking admission to the city’s specialized high schools,
and all four noted the school-program’s rising profile against historically well-known
school-programs, including the Established Individualist school-program.
Passionate Underdog’s Interpretation of the Admissions Process and Competition
Passionate Underdog’s interpretation of the admissions process was more focused
on the element of competition than engaging in the actual process. While they discussed
their admissions process, our interviews felt more like a reflection on the challenges of
competing with similar or more highly regarded school-programs, setting themselves
apart and trying to raise their profile, even as they discussed the importance of educating
all types of students. This is where their earlier comments from Chapter 4 seem to
resonate more greatly: the importance of the website, the importance of how visits are
experienced and implementing labor-intensive admissions tasks may be a way to increase
their presence in the quasi-marketplace of screened high school-programs.
Early in our interview Chip stated “you’re always thinking about where you fall
relative to other schools, because we don’t get enough kids. You always think, the better
the class, the greater the chance we will rise in the informal understanding of how
school’s like ours rank in the city.” Lulu echoed a similar sentiment, without prompting,
identifying school-programs they compete with and how the fact that “we sit at the lower
end of the spectrum” causes the system “to run out of kids to screen when they get to our
school.” Although Passionate Underdog clearly cares about their admissions process and
is invested in making it transparent, the sense of responsibility and enthusiasm for getting
to know students was more in the background of their experience, as opposed to the
experiences of participants at Established Individualist and Quiet Secret. Junot’s
description of the process was straight forward, and shows how the school makes the
process transparent for applicants: “at the Open House, we review the rubric with them,
we tell them exactly how they’ll be rated in each category and what we’re looking for; we
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also tell them about things they need to be on top of with their guidance counselor and we
try to make clear how we’re different from [school-programs that are similar to ours].”
In this section we can see that interpretation of the process and competition is
impacted by the reputation of the school-program and the degree to which the process is
conducted collaboratively. At Established Individualist, which boasted both a strong
reputation and a collaboratively conducted admissions process, the process was
interpreted more positively, competition more negatively and there was greater similarity
in messaging across interviews. At Quiet Secret, which has recently experienced a
positive shift in its reputation, but a less collaborative admissions process per current
personnel, the process was interpreted more neutrally and competition was often a
consideration. At Passionate Underdog, which has a struggling reputation and an isolated
admissions process, the process was interpreted as one where they had to be as
transparent and explicit as possible with applicants, and participants focused more on the
aspect of competition that they perceived as a constant challenge to overcome. Each
school-program’s prevailing professional culture, which became more apparent when I
analyzed internalization and normalization below, also impacted the interpretation of the
process and competition.
III. Internalization & Normalization of the Admissions Process and Competition
The coding category “Internalization and Normalization of the Admissions
Process and Competition” for interview data was again derived from the categories for
analyzing marketization provided by Saunder and Espeland (2009). Like these scholars, I
used this category to capture the extent to which those whose work in admissions, have
ultimately come to internalize and normalize the process and its accompanying
competition through changes in their daily work, school community and professional
culture. In coding this category, I often re-listened to interviews or re-read interview
transcripts through the lens of cognitive dissonance, where participants presented
evidence of both their embrace and rejection of the admissions process and its
competition. The moments when participants embraced the process and competition
could then be evaluated for whether or not they were examples of internalization and
79

normalization and in which of the sub-categories: changes in daily work, changes in
school community and changes in professional culture. In this case, internalizing the
process and competition means that the participant had fully integrated the process into
their understanding of school and their work; normalizing the process and competition
means that the participant speaks about these as if they are a part of normal work life, that
is, perhaps, not to be questioned and may actively spread their internalization to others or
to the greater school-program community.
Established Individualist’s Internalization & Normalization of the Admissions Process
and Competition
At Established Individualist there seems to be greater resistance to internalization
and normalization of the admissions process and competition, as was uncovered in their
interpretation of the process. They seem to have a culture of resistance to standardization
that is detailed further in the next section, but there are a few places where their daily
work, professional culture and school-program community seem to have internalized and
normalized the admissions process and its competition.
Both Mango and Isabel spoke with enthusiasm about how the admissions process
at Established Individualist has impacted their daily work. Both participants are
volunteers, although Isabel receives a small payment that Peaches described as an
“honorarium,” for her role as the Director of Admissions. Mango stated that after three
years of participating in the admissions process, she sees “it as a hobby” and Isabel is
“really interested and fascinated by it.” As volunteers in the process, they are not
employees of the Department of Education, but became involved because of their belief
in the mission and work of the school-program and a desire to keep a labor intensive
admissions process without adding to the labor of school staff, if possible. Mango agreed
that participation in the admissions process is a form of service to the school. As such,
their daily work is changed dramatically during admissions season because both
participants have other professional work outside the school-program, but both
communicated feelings of positivity about taking on the additional work of admissions.
Peaches, on the other hand experiences few changes in his work during admissions
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season that were discussed in the section on Established Individualist’s implementation
of the process and competition. He attends city- and borough-wide events to represent the
school-program on weekends, and “fields near-daily communications” from folks who
are interested in seeking priority admission for particular students, some from the upper
echelons of the Department of Education and the education research community. Peaches
agreed that these changes in his daily work during admissions season are part of his job
description as an administrator and stated that he “loves meeting new people, families
and kids, and telling them about how great our school is.” For these participants it
appears that the changes in daily work associated with admissions have been internalized
and normalized at Established Individualist, but since two of the three participants are
volunteers, it is difficult to assess whether this is true of all who are employed by the
school-program.
To further assess internalization and normalization of the process and
competition, I tried to understand the professional culture around admissions at
Established Individualist. According to my participants there is a clear professional
culture that is expected of teachers and personnel who work at Established Individualist,
and a separate culture for volunteer admissions committee members. For those who work
at Established Individualist as teachers and other personnel, there is an expectation that
teachers with “lighter teaching loads” will consider joining the admissions committee.
Peaches shared that all staff “get a blanket per-session (overtime) check, basically with
the understanding that we’re going to ask you to do stuff because we want the
atmosphere to be ‘lets work because we want to make a great school and we’ll all be
taken care of.’” As such, looking for the contributions of teachers with lighter course
loads to participate in particularly laborious processes is part of the accepted professional
culture at Established Individualist.
For admissions committee members, the professional culture is one of
responsibility and some secrecy. Isabel demonstrated that the school-program has
internalized the Department of Education’s messages about accountability in admissions,
even though she framed it almost as a resistance effort: “all the accountability measures
we’ve put in place, are really for us,” she claimed, when explaining the ways the
committee has crafted its rubrics and documentation process. Further, the politics of
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being a volunteer in charge of the admissions process of a highly-regarded schoolprogram was not lost on Isabel. As was discussed in the section on Established
Individualist’s interpretation of the admissions process and competition, Isabel expressed
an unwritten culture of secrecy in the admissions process “a lot of people don’t know that
I’m in charge, because the more people who know who’s doing this, the harder it is for
us.” This culture among admissions committee members was also voiced by Mango.
A final vehicle for examining the internalization and normalization of the
admissions process and competition at Established Individualist was to look at shifts in
the school-program community. For teachers and current students at Established
Individualist, they experience the changes in the community most emphatically by way of
the interview process. During the interview process, the admissions committee completes
as many as eight interviews per day, five days a week for about two to two-and-a-half
months. These interviews include tours to active classrooms where Mango stated that
“teachers have figured out how to maneuver through the tours and for the most part
teachers embrace it and it’s really cool to see what the kid will be like in the classroom.”
None of the participants felt that the school community was negatively impacted by the
classroom visits, but again, with only one participant who is employed by Established
Individualist, this should not be taken as an accurate conclusion. As such my
understanding of the shifts in the school-community are limited to simply knowing that
classrooms visits take place, and it is likely that they present some small level of
disruption at the very least.
All three participants, however, messaged a clear belief that the admissions
process can be used a vehicle for changing the school-program’s community. All three
participants discussed their commitment to pull away from the school-program’s highly
regarded profile that is attracting a shifting demographic of applicants. The participants at
Established Individualist all expressed interest in using admissions as a way to return to
the demographic of students that it traditionally served, which predominantly included
groups from historically underserved communities. “We’re a choice and we’re one of the
better choices, but we know that a lot of the kids applying to our school have really good
options in their districts” stated Isabel. “Perhaps its because the other school’s are fairly
new relative to us and don't have the same reputation, but we’re trying to get that mix
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back and understand what will help parents from those communities get their kids to us,”
explained Mango.
Quiet Secret’s Internalization & Normalization of the Admissions Process and
Competition
Quiet Secret provided some of the most interesting examples of internalizing and
normalizing the admissions process because all four participants spoke about the unique
level of commitment and investment they had in the process. This interpretation of the
process and competition lent itself to easily re-defined boundaries for daily work,
professional culture and the school-program community that participants acknowledged,
but perhaps did not realize the extent of. All four participants seemed to share a belief
that this redefinition is key to the mindset that is needed for successful implementation
the admissions process, a full normalization of the process. Additionally, participants
from Quiet Secret had internalized the competition endemic to the admissions process,
but had not outright normalized it, as exemplified from their discomfort in speaking about
the rising profile of their school-program.
Changes in professional culture seemed to be ground zero for internalization and
normalization of the admissions process and competition at Quiet Secret; these changes
had ripple effects on the daily work of those engaged in admissions and the schoolprogram community. For Jane, as a former administrator, she saw participation in the
admissions process as mandatory for all personnel and modeled that belief for all staff by
attending all fairs, tours, and reading “every application that came to our school.”
Recounting her challenges with garnering participation, she stated that there “were people
who you sometimes thought should [participate] as part of their professional obligation
and you gotta pull, kicking and screaming… and there were people who were really
committed to the profession and this was part of working in our school.” However, a
major challenge to this change in professional culture was the issue of compensation: a
further normalization of Jane’s internalized behavior was that this work was primarily
voluntary. She goes on to say that “those teachers did an awful lot of stuff on a voluntary
basis… but we evolved into a tradition as a school, of believing that that it was critically
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important that professional staff be secure about having a position and folks understood
that when the DOE started slicing budgets and there wasn't money…” she trails off, but
the implication is hanging in the conversation: from her supervisory position, those staff
who resisted participation in the voluntary work of admissions were more vulnerable to
budget cuts than those who did not resist.
The normalization of Jane’s attitude-- that participation in admissions was part of
everyone’s job description—had far reaching effects on professional daily work and the
school-program’s community. Jane described the changes in her own work, citing “I
probably spent less time during the regular school day going through application
materials, than I did after the regular school day or on weekends,” a sentiment
vehemently echoed by both Angelica and Daenerys. “I’m so enmeshed in it, all of us are
spending our weekends, December holiday, MLK Day, doing this work,” cited Angelica.
“It all gets done after 3:00pm, anything I do for high school admissions is after-school
time” stated Daenerys. Angelica provided a strong example when she spoke about the
challenges with the city-wide computer system where school-programs rank applicants,
describing her relationship with Daenerys as one that requires constant communication
about who is logged into the system: “we always say ‘don’t go on when I’m on,’ but
during those times, [Daenerys] is up until midnight, 1:00, doing it at off hours, weekends.
And then, you know, we’re not getting paid for that time, ok? We’re not getting paid, but
its just so we can get our rankings in there and save them.”
In Chapter 4, John described the need to take on the work of leading tours, despite
other professional obligations as a teacher because “they just had to happen.” In fact, he
could not recall a single staff member who had not led a tour or at least accommodated a
tour in their classroom. John, Angelica and Daenerys all stated that admissions work was
not part of their official job titles or descriptions, but Angelica noted that she “just added
[Admissions Coordinator] to my title for communication purposes,” citing that it helps to
smooth out the differences between her actual job title and the work that she’s doing
during admissions season. Jane, on the other hand, very much felt that admissions was
part of her job description, as exemplified by the way she re-shaped professional culture
at the school-program.
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The internalization and normalization of the admissions process exemplified by
changes in daily work also spread to the greater school-program community. Jane is
worth quoting at length here, when speaking about tours:
everybody knows people are coming in [from this hour to this hour]. So those are the
hours when you may be doing a show, you may be waving at people, and you know one
of the wonderful things about the school is that, I think kids and staff, got very
comfortable, very quickly with the idea that there are other people who are gonna walk in
and out of your classrooms.

Daenerys described this same process as “disrupting” to the classrooms, but also spoke
about how she “had a bunch of kids alphabetizing and sorting” application materials after
school, to support her in the work she does for admissions. In terms of student
participation, there seems to be no shortage at Quiet Secret: all four participants spoke
about the participation of students in tours, open houses and city- or borough-wide fairs
and the need to “prep kids to be tour leaders,” which consumes its own amount of time
and labor from personnel.
Competition is unevenly internalized and normalized at Quiet Secret. There
seemed to be consensus that the school-program’s profile was on the rise and having an
impact on the admissions process, but it was not fully embraced by the participants. On
media-produced rankings, Daenerys stated they “make me nervous because, its like if
you’re going to go so high, you can only go down,” and that she feels the staff does not
embrace them. Similarly, Jane stated that to her “they never felt like particularly valid or
important measures of anything,” even though she later stated that, as Peaches from
Established Individualist agreed, “they were nice medals to wear on your chest when you
needed them.” Contrastingly, Angelica’s statements indicated at least some
internalization of the competition. Throughout the interview she wove-in enthusiastic
quotes from middle school personnel, visitors and Central DOE staff that had confided in
her that the school-program was a rising star. She spoke about these comments with
enthusiasm and easily identified the elements of the school-program that were
objectionable in the eyes of desirable applicants.
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Passionate Underdog’s Internalization & Normalization of the Admissions Process and
Competition
At Passionate Underdog, the admissions process involves very few personnel and
therefore its internalization is limited to those who are engaged in admissions and
normalization of the process is limited to a few key areas, mostly focused on compliance.
Competition, on the other hand, has been fully internalized and normalized by the
participants at Passionate Underdog; this is where the real changes to daily work,
professional culture and school-program community were focused, as opposed to
normalizing admissions itself. Interestingly, this gave participants at Passionate
Underdog a type of unity in frustration with “the system of admissions” rather than the
school-program’s or individual’s experience.
The changes daily work around admissions at Passionate Underdog are limited to
administration and the small number of teachers and students who participate in open
house and city- or borough-wide events. Lulu, who is the administrator tasked with
coordinating the admissions process, experiences “high levels of stress” in the early fall
semester and, especially in January when the process is finalized. In the fall, Lulu with
some help from other personnel, directs and plans all of the open house events, city- and
borough-wide events, and coordinates all of the rubric ratings and ultimate rankings of
students. Her colleagues Chip and Junot cited limited involvement in these events other
than to be a part of them when they happen. They cited their most important contributions
as updating literature that publicizes their admissions process and its events, and
evaluating the applicant writing samples, all of which take direction from Lulu.
In terms of professional culture, it appears that those who are not involved in the
admissions process are completely disconnected from it. Because all of Passionate
Underdog’s open houses take place after school, only the students and teachers who
participate are impacted by these events. Essentially no one at Passionate Underdog
knows that an admissions process is happening, unless they are a part of it. Both Chip and
Junot were unable to answer quite a few of the interview questions despite their
involvement in the process and often referred me to Lulu. Lulu agreed that admissions is
part of her job description and does not look for additional compensation for the work she
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does to complete the job. Rather, she described a myriad of work that culminates at the
time of admissions that brings up feelings of resentment towards the Central DOE. She
cited that she also “support[s] guidance in college applications, I’m the testing
coordinator which includes January Regents exams, I have to flip the programs from the
Spring semester, and I coordinate admissions, all of which have to get done in the same
three week window and there’s no wiggle room!”
Competition was something that all three participants were able to speak about
with ease; all were able to identify the school-programs they compete with for students
and the ways that the system of admissions made it difficult for them to attract
candidates. Interestingly, while they all cited challenges with attracting applicants due to
elements beyond their control, like the reputation of their campus building, they were
also able to identify the ways that the Central DOE has helped them become more
competitive, like when they were approved to amend their programming in a way that
would attract higher performing applicants. My analysis of this embrace and rejection of
the little oversight that does exist in screened admissions processes, led me to conclude
that indeed the professionals at Passionate Underdog have internalized and normalized
the competition associated with admissions, perhaps more so than the process itself.
Although these three school-programs have varying levels of internalization and
normalization of the admissions process and competition, the women who coordinate or
direct admissions at all three school-programs best exemplify the attitude most that
piqued my curiosity ten years ago when I began working at a screened school-program:
Lulu: “For me personally, the whole season can be an intense moment of ‘can we
do it?’”
Isabel: “I just have to make this happen- there is no formal job description other
than ‘get it done, just get the work done.’
Angelica: “You know, what it is, is we just do more than our job expects us to do.
It's the only way it works… it really takes someone who is willing to go beyond
the normal boundaries because you’ve got to make it work, its our responsibility.”
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IV. Resistance to the Admissions Process and Competition
Like the others, the coding category “Resistance to the Admissions Process and
Competition” for interview data came from the work of Saunder and Espeland (2009).
Using their framework, I coded participant statements for resistance to the admissions
process and competition, ultimately deciding on three levels of resistance: individual
resistance, school-program resistance, and system-level resistance. When combined these
elements paint a picture of professionals who have a complex relationship with the
admissions process and competition: even those who have internalized and normalized
them struggle to reconcile the need to thrive in a system that will allow them to fail
against more altruistic, and traditional, professional identities (Lundstrom & Holm, 2011;
Cucchiara, Gold & Simon, 2011). Resistance was exemplified by attitudes and behaviors
that gave the participants or their school-program community agency in pushing back
against the implementation of the admissions process. At times this looked like schoolprogram level policies that guarded against perceived negative tendencies of the
admissions processes, individual actions they took when participating in the admissions
process or the cultivation of professional cultures that reject aspects of the process.
Established Individualist’s Resistance to the Admissions Process and Competition
As I have mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, Established Individualist
exhibits the most unified message of resistance to standardization by Department of
Education policies. When I asked questions that may have illuminated their participation
in events, relationships and communication with Central DOE, all three participants
consistently responded with a desire to limit their interactions with Central DOE as much
as possible when it came to admissions. Isabel summarized this sentiment best when she
said that Established Individualist “has historically always kind of fought against trying
to fit into any box that the DOE was trying to put them in.”
Although all three participants presented a unified message on school-program
level resistance, only one participant, Peaches, demonstrated individual resistance to the
process and its competition. Peaches provided several examples of ways that she resisted
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the admissions system by trying to leverage it to the advantage of the school-program.
Like Jane from Quiet Secret, Peaches talked about using accountability measures to “get
the highest rating we can possibly get, so we can flash it when we need to.” But the best
example she provided was using the requests for priority admission from upper level
DOE officials to counter-request the admission of minority, low-income students who
were struggling in other school-programs and wanted to transfer to Established
Individualist; according to Peaches, this counter-request was met with a disciplinary
action against her.
This particular example has had an impact on the school-program community. In
response to the incident described above and its subsequent disciplinary action Peaches
has committed to ending the policy of priority admission for what were previously called
“VIPs:” children of colleagues in the school-program or children of colleagues from
within Established Individualist’s network of similar school-programs. As a schoolprogram community, ending this practice may also give them leverage to refuse
prioritizing the admission of those with systemic clout and give them even greater
independence in their admissions process. Isabel and Mango also echoed sentiments of
pushing back against the admissions process, but they often framed their resistance as
thoughtfulness and thoroughness in their admissions process. Both participants talked
about the need to “really listen closely” to applicants and to make every attempt to make
the applicant comfortable so that committee members could “really get to know them.” In
both interviews, these participants consistently expressed a desire to humanize the
admissions process at as many levels as they could.
This school-program level resistance has implications for systemic resistance too.
All three participants were somewhat put-off by my questions about competition. As I
described earlier, the general interpretation of competition at Established Individualist is
that it is a distraction not to be concerned with; in fact, this very attitude is an act of
resistance. Refusing to buy into the rhetoric or normalization of competition in public
schools makes it easier for the school-program to set policies that question and resist
systemic norms which may in turn, support other school-programs in questioning and
resisting the norms that make the system fertile for competition. Peaches exemplified this
in her description of the high school fairs saying that, relative to other schools-programs,
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Established Individualist’s presence at the fairs was minimalist because Peaches feels that
attendees “don’t give a shit about pamphlets. They don’t need swag. They need a human
being telling them good things about the school.” This refusal to “sell” or “market” the
school-program challenges the internalized competition of other school-programs, but it
also shows that Established Individualist’s long-standing reputation has benefitted it in
the competitive screened high school-program marketplace.
Quiet Secret’s Resistance to the Admissions Process and Competition
Quiet Secret’s resistance to the admissions process and competition was present at
all three levels of resistance and best illustrated by Daenerys and Jane’s experiences. John
and Angelica gave no clear examples, attitudes or behaviors that could be defined as
resistance; this does not lead me to conclude a full embrace of the process on their part,
but the main evidence of resistance came from Jane and Daenerys.
On an individual level Daenerys talked about two ways she participated in
admissions and competition that could be defined as resistance. First, when asked about
participation in events to attract applicants she voiced staunch dislike of the city- and
borough-wide high school fairs—she is not alone in this, all ten participants talked about
the difficulty of the events, but she actively resisted participation in the events: “I hate
them. I hate them. I hate having to sell the school. I don't do the fairs anymore because it
never felt dishonest, but I personally didn’t like how it made me feel.” Second, as an
admissions committee member who rates application materials, she shared all the ways
she’s trained herself to be thoughtful about reading student writing samples: “its not the
kid’s fault that they got a form letter of recommendation, you can’t blame a kid for
handwriting an essay or not having anyone to spell check or edit their essay, you just
can’t hold it against them and have to see them more holistically, read between the lines.”
Along with other comments, it was clear that Daenerys, like those at Established
Individualist, sought out the humanity in the process to the best of her ability. With her
position in rating and ranking applicants, this attitude, constitutes an act of resistance
against a process that would likely be easier if she did not take the time to “read between
the lines.”
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This attitude of humanity was also part of Jane’s resistance. She cultivated the
school-program’s resistance by implementing two strategies for the admissions process:
the use of tours and caution about budgeting for the admissions process. Recall that Jane
is a former employee and during her time at the school there were tours during the school
day that required much labor. However, she framed this process as a form of resistance to
the admissions process because tours “allowed kids and families to see the work we do,
and to better evaluate if our school was the right environment for the student.” She went
on to describe how this helped the school-program answer questions for families about
what Quiet Secret offered without having to explicitly answer those questions—it was, in
her eyes, a way to empower them, so she always encouraged applicants to come on tours.
Interestingly, this same act was also part of the internalization and normalization of
admissions for those on staff, so resistance to support applicants meant a new
professional identity for personnel.
Jane also cultivated a form of systemic resistance at Quiet Secret, when it came to
budgeting for the admissions process. Although running the process and participating in
the competitive screened high school-program market can be costly, “we’d always find a
way to do it that had zero to do with the DOE,” she stated. She further explained that
asking for additional revenue to fund the admissions process, may inadvertently put other
priorities, like keeping class sizes small or maintaining a more experienced and therefore
costly faculty, at risk. By figuring out how to budget for the annual expenses associated
with the admissions process and creating a professional culture that expected staff
participation in admissions as a given, she walked the thin line between resistance to the
potential erosion of her school-program’s altruistic vision, while also embracing elements
that pushed professional staff towards a new professional identity. Her discussion of this
issue will be examined further in the next section of this chapter.
Passionate Underdog’s Resistance to the Admissions Process and Competition
Resistance to the admissions process and competition at Passionate Underdog was
difficult to find. As a school-program that often is unable to fully use the benefits of
being a screened school-program, their resistance, again, was more focused on the
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competitive aspect of the very existence of the admissions process. Recall that the
participants from Passionate Underdog often cited the lack of applicants to screen due in
part to competing with more established, highly regarded and similar school-programs.
Both Junot and Chip, were well-versed in the challenges that the admissions process and
school choice present to middle school applicants and their families; they easily
demonstrated how those challenges ultimately impacted their applicant pool. For them,
their frustration was about the ways the process seemed to homogenize and exclude their
school-program, but did not yield any specific forms of resistance.
Resistance to the admissions process and competition was most fertile at the
Established Individualist, both on an individual and school-program level, while at Quiet
Secret, resistance was more sporadic and specifically targeted; Passionate Underdog
seemed to be the least resistant to the process, although their lack of resistance does not
equate to a full embrace of the process as it is. From the ways that resistance unfolded
across the three school-programs, it seems that Established Individualist, which has the
longest history, is best able to resist elements of the admissions process and competition
that do not fit with their school-program’s culture, but maintain their status as a wellregarded, high performing school-program. Similarly, Quiet Secret has been able to
navigate some resistance with mixed results: some the resistance to the admissions
process was intended to benefit applicants, but those same acts of resistance had
consequences for the labor of professional staff employed by the school-program. This
issue of established history is discussed further in the next section.
V. The Development of an Enterprising-Self Beyond the Coding Categories
The following paragraphs discuss patterns that emerged from the interviews but
were not necessarily aligned with the coding categories. Aspects of these patterns
emerged in nearly every participant interview and further demonstrate the development
of an enterprising-self and the challenges to traditional professional identities that come
with marketization by way of the admissions process. These patterns include: the role of
an established school-program history, institutional knowledge of admissions personnel,
how admissions is paid for, the way admissions is connected to accountability measures,
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the role of professional women in the admissions process and the challenges of talking
about adult labor in public education. The patterns are discussed in this order and build
on one another.
How long a school-program has been established matters, as does the length
of time it has had a history of selectivity or a strong reputation. All three of these
allow a school-program to engage in less marketing over time and place more focus on
conducting a quality admissions process that includes reflection and even opportunities to
resist elements of the admissions system that it has the clout to. John from Quiet Secret
pointed out that “there is something to be said for a school that has made it to its 10th or
15th year—there are schools that have opened and closed in that time, so just being
around longer provides more opportunity to develop a record of success and just, like…
existence.” This was further demonstrated in the actual coding categories themselves,
where Established Individualist and Quiet Secret are both highly selective schoolprograms, while Passionate Underdog’s personnel discussed the need to be constantly
dispelling myths about their school that they’re “not as focused” of a school as their
competitors, or needing to clarify changes in programming that are in clearly stated in
newer literature on the school-program, but applicants may be looking at outdated
literature, like an old High School Directory.
In a similar vein, institutional history and knowledge matters for those who
participate in admissions. Admissions work seems to attract personnel who have a
longer history in the school, have a working knowledge of the school’s mission and
purpose and have a clear vision for what makes for a strong applicant to the school. All
three participants who claimed the title “director” or “coordinator” of admissions have
been active in the school-program community for several years. Angelica and Lulu have
both worked at their school-programs for nine years, although not always in the role of
admissions coordinator/director and Isabel, who has spent three years as director of
admissions, was also a member of the admissions committee at Established Individualist
for two years prior to taking on the role. Of all participants, eight of the ten had five or
more years of experience in their position in that school-program, but may have many
more years of experience in another position or another school-program. In a school
system that reports a loss of 50% of its teachers within five years of beginning their
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career at the NYC DOE, the fact that all three school-programs have admissions members
with this length of service is noteworthy (NYC Independent Budget Office, 2016). All
participants were able to recall historical changes to their school-programs admissions
process, to greater or lesser significance, but their knowledge allowed them to speak in
great depth about their school-program’s admissions process and, with the exception of
Chip and Junot, were able to speak confidently to all of my interview questions.
Volunteering and working a variety of off-hours is the norm for those
participating in their school’s admissions process. How to pay for the costs and labor
associated with admissions and competition was a voluminous part of every interview.
When asked if they were aware of any budget lines or funds set aside by the Central DOE
to support this process, all ten participants said that there was no funding provided by the
Central DOE to offset the costs of this process. Half of my participants are administrators
with access to the budgets of their school-programs; to quote Jane “there was nothing.
Absolutely nothing.” Participants consistently reported that the work of admissions cut
into preparation periods, lunches, after-school time, weekends, holidays, and even their
sleep in the final days before rankings have to be completed.
Each school-program has its own way of coping with this challenge. As discussed
in earlier sections on Established Individualist, all eight to nine members of their
admissions committee are volunteers. Their Director of Admissions is provided an
honorarium for her work, which is raised by the Parents Association. Teachers who are
asked to join the admissions committee do so because they have a lighter teaching load
and, like all staff at Established Individualist, they are provided with a blanket persession, or overtime, pay that is equal to that of their colleagues who perhaps run clubs or
do other additional tasks for the school-program. At Quiet Secret, there is no payment for
admissions work because it has been established as part of the professional culture of the
school. The only person who is paid for admissions work at Quiet Secret is Angelica, but
her official title in the DOE does not reflect that admissions is part of her work and
therefore it’s difficult to know if that work is acknowledged by the Department of
Education. At Passionate Underdog, the primary architect of their admissions process is
Lulu, who, again, subscribes to the notion that this work is part of her job description as
an administrator; teachers who participate in the open houses, weekend events, or the
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rating of applicant writing samples are paid per-session, or overtime pay, but those costs
are kept to a set number of hours.
There is a cognitive dissonance about how the admissions process impacts
accountability measures and the perceived standing of screened school-programs.
When asked about whether or not they considered accountability measures when they
rated applicants or an incoming class, all participants except for Chip and Peaches,
replied that they did not and their responses were often absolute: “No,” “never,” “not that
I’m aware of,” “not on my watch.” Where the participants in Saunder and Espeland’s
work clearly saw the cycle of admissions patterns leading to selectivity leading to
perceived institutional quality, leading to rankings, which led to the next cycle of
admissions, this connection did not seem as clear to most of my participants.
Chip and Peaches, on the other hand, articulated the connection well, but both
qualified their statements with the fact that accountability measures were never an
explicit part of the admissions process when considering applicants; Peaches replied:
I think they are in a way, that they are probably one in the same. Like, everything
that we're doing as a school, like, results in this rating and so how we make a
school, how we make a student body has something to do with it.
Similarly, Chip stated:
I guess you always think the better the class—it's a chicken and egg thing- the
greater the chance that we will rise in the informal understanding of how schools
rank in the city. I guess in the back of your head, all the time, given that we’re a
screened school with these set criteria that are given by the system, you’re always
thinking where you fall relative to the other schools.
The labor of admissions is overwhelmingly performed by women. My call for
participants and eligibility screening only allowed for candidates that had involvement
and a working knowledge of their screened school-program’s admissions process, and my
participants reflect the approximate sex breakdown of the NYC DOE’s larger workforce:
seven out of ten of my participants are women (NYC Independent Budget Office, 2016)
and all three participants who direct or coordinate admissions at their school-program are
women. Although the local and national workforce of public education is overwhelming
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female, and not a new idea, the fact that the implementation of the admissions process is
primarily run by women but is largely unpaid for recalls the work of Dorothy Smith.
Smith theorized that women’s work, when performed well, is invisible to their male
counterparts and supervisors; such that their work is often taken for granted, underpaid
and under-resourced, even though those men of authority have their own reputations and
work bolstered because of women’s work (Smith, 2010). Isabel stated “this is not a
formal job position through the DOE—the DOE doesn't recognize that we need
somebody to do this.” Given the extraordinary boundaries that have been pushed by the
women who perform the work of admissions, Smith’s idea begs us to consider, at the
very least, an established official job title for this work.
How do we talk about adult labor related to the admissions process, when it
is not politically viable to do so? As was discussed in the introduction to this study,
there is a wonderful body of research on the impact of this process on middle school
applicants and their families, which concludes that kids and families are hurt by this
process. That literature alone begs for a change in the process and provides excellent
political justification to do so. But there is also an adult labor cost to the implementation
of this process that is not being discussed in American education research literature.
European scholars, by comparison, have been bold to discuss the adult labor cost of
implementing market strategies into public education systems and the same needs to be
discussed in the United States. Participants in this study, upon reflection through the
interview, seemed to arrive at the conclusion that the admissions process is a lot of work.
They were eager to talk about how much they loved the process and how important it is
to them and their school-program, but that enthusiasm was somewhat deflated by
reflecting on how much work they were doing that was going unpaid and, by definition of
being unpaid, unrecognized, despite how important they feel it is. Some participants
estimated for the cost of the labor associated with admissions and came up with dollar
amounts ranging from $200,000 to $10,000 per year, if the process at their schoolprogram was fully funded. It seems that at the very least a more established salary line or
a conversation about a collectively bargained position for screened school-programs
tasked with implementing the process, is called for.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter illuminated the human layer of the process of marketization and
developing an enterprising-self. I conclude that the school-program’s reputation and the
degree of collaboration in implementing the admissions process impacts each
participant’s interpretation and internalization and normalization of, and resistance to, the
admissions process and its competition. Its clear that part of the process of the schoolprogram developing an enterprising-self has to do with the ways that professionals
embrace or deny their individual responsibilities in implementing the process, as
expressed by their resistance and reflection on the process and competition. In schoolprograms where individuals enacted greater resistance and reflection on the process, the
school-program was able to develop an enterprising-self, but on its own terms, constantly
checking their involvement in the process and its alignment with school-program values.
In school-programs where there was less resistance and reflection on the process, the
development of an enterprising-self was almost uncontrollable—they were more likely to
follow directives from Central DOE, but also take on greater personal responsibility for
the outcomes of their admissions process and place in the competitive high school
marketplace. Further, this chapter shows how the leadership of each school-program can
dictate the individual work, professional culture and school-community attitudes about
the admissions process. Leadership has the power to cultivate compliance and thoughtful
resistance at a variety of scales, as well as shaping the power of competition the system
tends to inflict on school-programs.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, &
FUTURE RESEARCH
Discussion of Findings
How has the work of school professionals been redefined by the implementation
of the high school admissions process? How has redefinition impacted the nature and role
of the work of school professionals, if any redefinition exists? These were my initial
research questions based on my experience working as a teacher in screened high schoolprograms in New York City public schools. From my research I conclude that indeed the
work of school professionals has been redefined by the implementation of the high school
admissions process, outlined in Table 6.1, and that the redefinition has impacted the work
of school professionals in the ways described in Tables 6.2. For each table I divided my
conclusions into two categories: those who are engaged in the admissions process and all
professionals in the school-program community. I did this to show that there is a
difference between those who are fully engaged in the admissions process and those who
may be experiencing effects of the admissions process simply as a result of working in
their school-community, a type of secondary experience; the extent to which work has
been redefined depends on this difference.
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Table 6.1 How the Work of Professionals in Screened High School-Programs Has Been
Redefined
Those who are engaged in the admissions
All professionals in the schoolprocess at their school-program
program
• Experience a deepened sense of
• Experience a shift in their work
importance as they take on the
that moves their daily, seasonal or
responsibility of shaping the schoolannual work towards marketing
program’s community by way of
practices (Lundstrom & Holm,
admissions (Fraser, 2009)
2011)
• Develop an enterprising-self geared
• Experience an intensification of
toward successful completion of the
their work due to the admissions
admissions process (Peters & Besley,
process (Lundstrom & Holm,
2007)
2011)
• Experience an increase in work related to
• Experience the need to compete
customer service (Cucharria, Gold, Simon,
for student applicants (Gerwitz,
2011)
Bowe & Ball, 2011)
• Experience an intensification of their work
due to the admissions process (Lundstrom
& Holm, 2011)
Table 6.2 Impact of the Redefinition of Work on Professionals in Screened High SchoolPrograms
Those who are engaged in the admissions
All professionals in the schoolprocess at their school-program
program
• May or may not be aware of the impact of • Intensification of work may
competition on accountability measures
challenge traditional professional
(Gerwitz, Bowe & Ball, 2011)
identities by asking professionals
to do more and more work beyond
• Competition may be internalized and
the realm of educating students in
normalized to the point where these
the classroom (Lundstrom &
professionals accept the competition and
Holm, 2011)
its implications as a normal part of public
school life (Gerwitz, Bowe & Ball, 2011) • May need to reconcile competing
professional identities as educators
• May or may not be aware of the ways that
in order to remain in the schoolselectivity is impacting their admissions
program community (Lundstrom
process and the competition it engenders
& Holm, 2011)
(Hoxby, 2009; Pascarella & Terenzini,
2005)
From Tables 6.1 & 6.2 we can see that there is more redefinition of work and
impacts of that redefinition on those who are specifically engaged in the admissions
process. Because the work of admissions is not written into any particular official job
description in the Department of Education, it is unclear how many school professionals
this redefinition may be impacting. As Isabel stated in Chapter 5, there seems to be no
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formal recognition by the Department of Education that screened school-programs need
an employee who’s job is explicitly to manage admissions. Since the high school
admissions process is largely unregulated, there may be a sense that school-programs are
making it work, and they are, but at a real human cost.
As the data in Chapter 4 showed, screened school-programs are increasingly using
more labor-intensive admissions tasks to screen applicants, such as visits, writing
samples and interviews; these tasks increase the selectivity and competition of their
school-program as we saw in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. In Chapter 5 Angelica, Daenerys,
Peaches, Isabel, Lulu, John, Jane and Junot all spoke about the labor involved in these
processes and how much preparation and time they require. They described working
without pay, as DOE employees, John even mentioned that he recalls “there being pizza,
but no per-session that I can remember.” Additionally, as school-programs become more
established and selective, we know that they develop the privilege of moving away from
marketing practices, but take on the burden of dedicating themselves to an ever higher
quality admissions process which may increase clerical tasks, require greater
communication and/or relationship building with middle school personnel, and generally
intensify their workload, despite the fact that they often have other official
responsibilities that are affiliated with their designated job title, such as administrator,
teacher or guidance counselor.
Further, there is a sense of responsibility that is engendered in all the participants
who take on the role of “Director” or “Coordinator” of admissions. As scholars of
neoliberal policy and neoliberal governmentality have described, nearly all of the
participants believed that admissions was among the most important work the schoolprogram was engaged in. John, Peaches, Mango, Junot and Chip, all of whom had limited
roles in their school-programs admissions process, talked about how invested they felt in
the process and were able to speak fluently on what they believe the implications of the
process are. But their sense of responsibility for those outcomes was far out-weighed by
that of their colleagues who were more deeply entrenched in the admissions process.
Jane, Angelica, Lulu, Isabel and Daenerys all exhibited traits of the neoliberal worker,
where personal responsibility for the success or failure of the process rests, almost solely
on them (Fraser, 2009; Harvey, 2011). As Saunder and Espeland found with their
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participants, those who were more deeply engaged in the admissions process seemed to
self-impose adherence to the discipline of the admissions process by internalizing and
normalizing the actions and attitudes associated with admissions, to greater extents than
those whose involvement was limited to one or only some of the aspects of admissions.
The difference in those professionals engaged in the admissions process is an
exhibition of Espeland and Saunder’s concept of reactivity, where those more deeply
involved in the process may “struggle to reconcile their sense of themselves as
professional educators with an imposed market-based logic of accountability” (p. 66). As
Lundstrom and Holm (2011) found with Swedish school professionals undergoing
marketization, all the participants in this study had moments of reflection where they
acknowledged the ways that the admissions process had thrust them into a changed
version of their professional roles. John spoke of willingly giving up preparation and
lunch periods to support tours or rate application materials; Junot talked about his
personal fall and winter schedule needing to accommodate admissions related events;
Jane and Daenerys explicitly stated how they completed nearly all admissions related
work during off-hours; and Isabel and Mango are not employed by their school-program,
but volunteer to do the work, beyond their own personal and professional responsibilities.
With these actions, each of the participants is normalizing an increased workload
affiliated with admissions and establishing new professional expectations, a process
which is a direct product of the marketization of the entire public education system in
New York City.
The increased workloads and the new professional expectations affiliated with the
implementation of the admissions process require that professionals expand their work to
include competing for applicants and fostering a sense of customer service in their
everyday work (Cucchiara, Gold, Simon, 2011; Gewirtz, Bowe & Ball, 2011). Tables 4.9,
4.10 and 4.11 show an increasing volume of screened school-programs using the more
labor-intensive admissions processes and that those school-programs that are more highly
selective are more likely to be using those processes; reflective of these findings is the
fact that all three of the screened school-programs I used in my case study employ two or
more of the three most labor-intensive admissions tasks: visits, evaluating writing
samples and interviews. Any school professional working in a school-program that uses
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visits or interviews during the school day as a method of admissions, is suddenly engaged
in customer service and competing for student applicants. Jane described the hours when
tours were happening as “a show,” where the tone of was for “everyone to feel
welcome;” Mango described the classrooms and hallways as “being on display;” while
Lulu described the importance of visits going smoothly as a show of organization and
professionalism on the part of the school-program. During these events, every teacher and
staff member who is teaching in a classroom, walking down the hallway or completing a
task in the main office, may be observed or engaged by a prospective student and their
family. The heightened stakes of these interactions put all staff members in a position to
potentially do the work of customer service. This work is further intensified for all
professionals if, as at Quiet Secret, the professional culture expects all school
professionals to be a regular part of the process of rating applicant materials.
Implications Of Findings
At The Local Level
In New York City public schools, the implications of this research are far
reaching. Since the implementation of the current iteration of high school admissions in
2006, school choice policies and similar processes have been implemented at all levels of
schooling, including entry into kindergarten and transitioning from kindergarten to
middle school. If the findings of this study are to be relied upon, then the same
redefinition of the work of school professionals in screened high school-programs, may
have spread to a much wider group of school professionals at every level of schooling.
Refocusing just on the high school level, screened high school-programs may not be the
only types of school-programs affected by the redefinition of work. Visits are a widely
used tool of the high school admissions process and are available at school-programs that
use admissions methods other than “screened.” Just the use of visits, especially those
conducted during the school day, creates a shift in professional culture that increases
customer service work and spreads it to all staff in the building during the visits. In the
sections below, I discuss recommendations and future research to examine this issue.
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In screened school-programs there is an entire semester of the school year where
the attention and labor of professionals engaged in the admissions process is divided
between their actual job responsibilities and the work of admissions. For administrators
this may mean forgoing the completion of teacher observation reports in favor of
managing the more time-constrained ranking of student applicants in the citywide
computer system. For teachers this may mean forgoing a more thoughtful grading of
current student writing, knowing that after school they’ll also be rating applicant-writing
samples. In either case, we know from this research that those who are expected to
participate in admissions processes are taking on additional work that makes them less
available for the education of their current student body. All compliance initiatives take
time and energy and often to the benefit of students, but this is not a compliance
initiative; it is an unfunded mandate that places school professionals in a position to
increase their workload without formal acknowledgement, participate in a cycle of
competition, and make their work less about educating students and increasingly about
marketing their school-program.
At The National Level
The most challenging aspect of uncovering the human and, essentially hidden,
costs of the implementation of the high school admissions process in New York City, is
that our current federal administration and its Secretary of Education, seek to expand
school choice policies. Although the current administration often finds itself at odds with
New York City, the previous administration often held New York City’s public schools
as an exemplar of many policies, including school choice. As such, several of the
blueprints for implementing school choice in New York City have been used in a variety
of other cities across the nation such as Chicago, Denver and New Orleans, where former
NYC DOE staff are now or were recently employed, to help roll out school choice
policies. For the current administration, the creation of “choice” outweighs the need for
accountability—accountability that supports students and accountability that supports the
needs of school professionals when implementing school choice policies (Devega, 2017).
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The current Secretary of Education has a record of supporting policies that
destabilize public education systems and then using that destabilization as a way to
demonize the public schools and garner support for privatization (Strausse, 2016). These
actions include support for policies that undermine the work of school professionals and
their unions, making it difficult to complete the primary task of educating students and
maintaining a qualified, committed workforce (Henderson, 2016). Considering the
implications of this research, its clear that the current federal administration poses a
considerable threat to the workload and professional identities of school professionals
who are already working to reconcile their traditional identities, associated with “helping
kids,” against the marketization reforms that require them to “go beyond the normal
boundaries” of their work.
Recommendations
In every interview I asked participants if they thought the admissions process
needed to be improved or changed, and if so, how. The suggestions of these participants
are worthy of consideration and I have folded some of their ideas into my suggestions for
future research. Interestingly, participants provided recommendations at a variety of
scales- some for the entire system, others directed recommendations to the admissions
process itself and still others made recommendations at the school-program level. To
protect the privacy of participants and their school-programs, I’ve declined to identify
which participants made which recommendations, on the chance that their
recommendations may reveal their identity or school-program.
Recommendations for the Entire School System:
Some participants felt strongly that the current admissions system is not working
and even cited it as a motivation for their participation in the study; others recommended
an expansion of guidance staff at the middle school level and more extensive training for
them in their certification programs, or by the DOE, about supporting seventh and eighth
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grade students in navigating high school choice. Finally, two participants recommended
that we simply end the current system and switch to a policy of controlled choice.
For those who felt the current system is not working, they cited a lack of
preparation for navigating the process, conflicts with their own moral compass, and the
need for a return to confidence in the humans who choose to work in public schools.
Those participants are worth quoting at length here:
I guess, I think that people who move into the private school sector understand
that admissions and PR around admissions, is an important part of the school and
the school’s life. But public schools and folks who’ve committed themselves to
public schools… I certainly wasn't prepared for this, and I wonder if others
are…perhaps, they love it, love the competition.
I don't think there is a Central fix. We're living in under the Central fix, right, this
is supposed to be the one-- the computer program that like, solved racism and
school choice, and its clearly not doing that. So if the computer can't do it then
why not let people do it? And why not trust that it is in the best interests of every
school, that every school serves a very diverse group of students?
Participating in admissions makes me feel weird, but I also see how its connected
to every aspect of our school community, so I want to be a part of it because I’m a
team player. But every time I have to give the ‘what’s special about our school’
talk, I want to hide in my classroom and teach for all six hours, but I can’t escape
it because every kid in my room is a product of that system, so I don’t have a
choice about which to pay attention to. They’re the same.
Recommendations for the Admissions System:
Participants recommended, broadly that the city-wide computer system for
gathering data on, and ranking applicants, needs an overhaul; they recommended revising
the timelines for admissions, and recommended either the creation of a DOE title for
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admissions or at the very least, a line in the budget to accommodate the costs of
admissions.
Any participant who completed the ranking of students in the city-wide computer
system, known as the Pupil Candidate List (PCL), felt strongly that it was not meeting
their needs. They reported issues with “saving” entries once they were entered, not being
able to have multiple users entering rankings, and frequent inability to use the system
during school hours because of the volume of users, which forced them to have to use the
system at off-hours. This particular issue exacerbates the need to work beyond the
boundaries of their normal workday and incurring unpaid hours of labor.
Another recommendation was that high school-programs be given January
Regents week, an additional seven-day period, to finalize rankings for applicants.
Although taking the recommendation may push back the “match day” experience for
middle school students, the rationale was that it would be better to support screened high
school-programs trying to conduct a quality admissions process, by not rushing the final
steps of the process.
A final recommendation for the admissions system was that the admissions
process and its accompanying work be more formally acknowledged by the Department
of Education with the creation of a line in the budget to at least off-set the costs of
conducting admissions processes (marketing materials, websites, labor) in conjunction
with any of the following: have the UFT fold admissions work into the possibilities for
Circular 6 or professional responsibilities in the current contract; add admissions work to
the job description of an existing title with an accompanying salary increase; create a new
salaried position for an “Admissions Coordinator,” perhaps under DC37 or UFT
contracts.
Recommendations at the School-Program Level:
Screened school-programs need a way for the enrollment office to help them get a
better mix of students; several participants were concerned about the fact that their
school-program does not educate a representative sample of the student body of New
York City, including ability, socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, neighborhoods and
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more. Participants felt that they did not know how to attract, and/or might be fearful of
what happens to their standing if they attract, a more balanced mix of students that better
reflect the educational needs of the city. Still other participants are having difficulty
moving their school-program’s reputation towards a school that is just “fine” when there
is a negative history associated with their campus building and/or the school, that seems
to be inescapable, especially with accountability histories and parent/student reviews
everywhere on the internet.
Recommendations for Further Research:
It is my opinion that this research only provides the foundational understanding
that the admissions process in screened-school programs in New York City has redefined
the work of school professionals and that redefinition has had a variety of impacts.
However, I see this research as the jumping off point for several other avenues of
research, some of which I hope to conduct myself and some of which should be left to
those with greater expertise in areas like labor unions and women’s labor. Additionally,
I’ve included areas for future research that attempt to correct some of the limitations of
my study, including sample size and challenges with the dataset I created.
With school choice policy being expanded to all levels of schooling in New York
City and a federal administration eager to further expand this policy, a study is needed to
further examine the redefinition of school professionals at the middle school level and
perhaps even at the elementary school level. As elementary school professionals prepare
students to apply to middle school and middle school professionals prepare students to
apply to high school, we need to know the extent to which their workload is being
expanded, redefined and, perhaps, even detracting from the education of the student-body
who are not yet approaching this transition.
An extension of the above-discussed study would be an examination of labor. In
New York City, public school professionals all work under collectively bargained
contracts, but the work of professionals who are employed by the DOE and are engaged
in their school-program’s admissions process, goes beyond the boundaries of those
contracts. There is an entire body of research literature on labor unions and, specifically,
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on the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and the Council of School Supervisors &
Administrations (CSA). One avenue for research that this study warrants is to examine
how these labor unions understand the work of school professionals engaged in
admissions processes.
Continuing on the topic of labor is the finding that women, most often perform
the invisible work of the admissions process. For those engaged in scholarship on
feminist theory, sociology and women’s labor, this finding may be fertile ground for an
examination of whether this finding is accurate across the world of school admissions and
if this finding can be further established, in terms of acknowledgement of labor, pay for
labor, and how women construct their experience to rationalize the invisibility of their
work.
Two participants in the study are fairly recent graduates of administrator
certification programs and one participant is an adjunct-lecturer in an administrator
certification program; all three told me that there was no part of their training programs
that prepared them for participation in the admissions process. Although this was not a
major part of my findings, one decade into the high school choice system in New York
City, does seem warrant a need for certification programs in the city to prepare those who
seek to become administrators for this process. What, if any preparation, is provided for
those applying for certification as school building and district leaders, on how to navigate
the school choice process in New York City? If no preparation exists, what would an
effective unit of study on the process look like?
To correct for the limitations of my study, I feel that the quantitative portion of
my research needs to be conducted again, with access to more specific data from the
Department of Education. While the publicly available Directory of New York City High
Schools and accountability measures provided by the OpenNYC initiative are strong
foundations, my participant interviews led me to believe that these data sources are at
times inaccurate or do not provide the full picture of a school-program that would make
for a more accurate dataset. Further, the variables I created had limitations on tests for
statistical significance. As such, the only responsible step to take was to use those
variables to provide descriptive statistics in Chapter 4 and use those descriptive statistics
to guide my interview selection and questioning. Another round of analysis on an
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improved, more malleable dataset, would allow me to provide conclusions with statistical
significance.
A final limitation of this work that may be corrected with a renewed version of
this study is to have a greater pool of interviewees across a greater number of schoolprograms or to be able to conduct surveys of larger portions of professionals in screened
school-programs. While three school-programs and ten participants certainly provided me
with a wide range of experiences, I feel strongly that there is more to be culled from this
portion of the research. A follow up study would hopefully include more voices from
teachers, clerical and guidance staff working in screened school-programs; I found these
interviews to be the most insightful and surprising, but they were also the most hesitant to
participate in the research, as opposed to administrators.
Final Word
The work of professionals in the high-school admissions process is impacted by a
variety of factors that are sometimes within or beyond their control. The interpretation,
internalization and normalization of, or resistance to, the admissions process is impacted
by a school-program’s reputation, how collaborative its admissions process is and most
importantly, how its leadership shapes norms around all elements of the admissions
process and its competition. Those who work in the admissions process in screened high
school-programs encounter similar challenges to those who work in admissions in higher
education: the allure and anxiety of raising their profile, the fear of falling in rankings or
perceived institutional quality, a constant need to reconcile amendments to their
admissions process that help lessen their workload or increase the quality of the process
for applicants. It appears that with each addition to the admissions process that might
help the school-program feel more aligned with its own values or more professional or
more competitive, there is a human cost to that work. Every change creates more work
for someone, whether that work is temporary, like building the infrastructure of a website
to accommodate sign up for tours, or more permanent, like taking the title of Admissions
Coordinator and all the accompanies that title.
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This study demonstrates that the implementation of the high school admissions
process in New York City public schools has increased and redefined the work of
professionals in screened school-programs. That redefinition has impacted the individual
work, professional culture and entire community of screened school-programs unevenly,
most often weighing the heaviest on a few key individuals whose additional work load
due to this process, is frequently without formal acknowledgement from the Central DOE
or the contractual work of any labor union that operates in the DOE. This work is
primarily conducted by women who accept and see this work as an important
responsibility, worth taking on regardless of the acknowledgement. As such, their
professional identities, at times, require them to switch back and forth between their
ascribed job title work and the work of admissions; in some moments they are able to
step back and see the connections between all of their work, but the pace and volume of
the work of admissions does not permit them to linger in reflection. Rather, they open the
envelopes, enter information, answer phones, coordinate events, and finalize the process
while repeating a mantra of “just get it done, just make it happen.”
Chapter 6 Summary
This chapter brings together all of the research to examine both the bigger picture
and the nuanced picture. Here I discuss the kinds of redefinition of work that the high
school admissions process has engendered and the impact of that redefinition. Further, I
highlight several areas where the quantitative and qualitative data tell a rich story of
professional educators navigating their way around a mandated system that they
implement with a fierce sense of responsibility, which sometimes challenges their
professional identities and seeps into their personal time beyond their true professional
obligations; they do all of it in service of their school-program, to which they often have
a strong sense of loyalty. The chapter also provides policy recommendations for the
Department of Education, from participants regarding ways that the admissions system
could be changed or improved at three scales: individual school-programs, the admissions
system itself and the entire Department of Education. I also identify areas for future
research that include possible studies to correct the limitations of this study.
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